| Volume 7, Issue
1 |
15-21 March 2004 |
Is
human rights on the agenda?
The
60th session of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
begins not very differently from last year's session.
With the echoes of the dastardly Madrid bomb blasts
still ringing in delegates' ears, the issue of
'terrorism vs human rights' is likely to remain
centrestage, and some delegations are no doubt asking
themselves why they are here, talking about human rights
in the first place.
Except
that States are fundamentally wrong to assume that
anti-terror measures must necessarily be in contradiction
with human rights. Human Rights Features has consistently
held that special measures may sometimes be necessary to
counter terrorism, with the rider that such measures must
be temporary and in conformity with judicial due process
norms. Fundamental liberties, such as the right not to be
tortured, cannot be eroded. The past year however has seen
no let-up in States' willingness to bend these principles.
This is reflected in the reports of the CHR's special
mechanisms and studies on the ground by non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) all over the world.
Now
is the time for the CHR to affirm the reason for which it
was created - to guarantee respect for fundamental rights
in general, but particularly in times of crisis, when they
seem unimportant in the greater scheme of things such as
'national security'. As discussed elsewhere in this issue,
this could involve the setting up of mechanisms of
interaction with the Counter Terrorism Committee, and
establishing national mechanisms to report on the human
rights implications of anti-terror legislation. (see
article in this issue titled “CTC: Counter human rights
committee?”)
CHR
observers are unable to be optimistic about the outcomes
of the current session, with good reason. A case in point
is the meeting on Regional Arrangements for the Asia
Pacific region, organised earlier this month by the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Doha,
Qatar. Diplomats from the region were in their element,
watering down progressive drafts, effectively carrying out
a dry run ahead of the CHR session. A delegate from
Myanmar went so far as to suggest that the meeting be
wound up early so that he - and presumably, other
delegates - could squeeze in a round of golf!
Other
disturbing nuggets of information were revealed,
unofficially – chiefly relating to new, improved
attempts to whittle away at the CHR's role and functioning
through the insidious process of "rationalisation".
Well-meaning member States, and observers, including NGOs,
would do well to carefully monitor the Asian group's
activities, in particular, attempts to alter the text of
Resolution 110 relating to "Improvement of the work
of the session".
The
European Parliament's resolution on the European Union's
rights, priorities and recommendations for the 60th CHR
session calls on the EU to sponsor or co-sponsor
resolutions on an impressive list of countries, including
China, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti,
Iraq, the Israeli Occupied Territories and the area under
the Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco,
Libya, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Côte d´Ivoire,
Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo,
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chechnya, Belarus, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan. It also notably calls for resolutions on India
(in particular, the situation in Gujarat), Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia. Good intentions, however, are all very well.
Its attempts to push through resolutions on Chechnya and
Zimbabwe last year during the 59th session floundered
because EU delegations failed to work the corridors. Any
attempt to defeat the Like Minded nexus would need strong
support from other groups and the fence-sitters. But, as
we know, the EU watched miserably as the resolutions
faltered and died.
The
EU, furthermore, needs to fight the inclination to be
cautious with respect to States like India. EU-India
dialogues have included few references to human rights,
and the ones that did find their way into joint statements
were empty shells, devoid of specifics. The European
Parliament has recommended that the EU sponsor or
co-sponsor a resolution on India on the situation in
Gujarat. As it stands, there are no indications to suggest
that the EU can summon the necessary courage and consensus
to ensure, if not a resolution, at the very least a
paragraph in its joint statement, on the continuing lack
of accountability in Gujarat. Nonetheless, the duty to
bring the issue forward remains with the EU, particularly
since India and the EU are "natural partners" in
the words of former EU commissioner Chris Patten.
The
United States is expected to introduce resolutions against
China and Cuba. The first is a result of pressure from
within the US to take note of the increasing reports of
human rights abuses in China. It has come with the
realisation that trade relations, by themselves, do not
guarantee respect for basic liberties, and while there is
not much hope for the resolution, it is for the US and
other countries to keep the pressure on Beijing. While
they are at it, the US delegation would do well to tell
allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan what it really
thinks of their rights records.
With
regard to Cuba, it is time for the Latin American
countries to retrieve their heads from the sand and take a
good, long look at the indulgences they allow their
neighbour. While the Latin American group puts up a
spirited show against the rights records of other
countries, it has shockingly allowed Cuba a further
three-year run at the CHR. The Cuban delegation will now
have more time to do what it does best: chip away at every
progressive initiative at the CHR, assisted by its
Like-Minded friends.
Finally,
the assault on the CHR's special procedures looks set to
continue. The first signs have already emerged, with China
taking umbrage at the methods followed by the Special
Rapporteur on the right to education, who produced an
excellent report, tearing down every myth that China had
built around itself regarding its commitment to economic
rights. And Israel added its bit by firing a broadside at
the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.
It
is time to bring human rights back onto the agenda. And to
discard the tiresome debates and accusations of "politicisation",
probably the most frequently used word at the CHR. As the
late Sergio de Mello stated at the close of the 59th
session, "For some to accuse others of being
political is a bit like fish criticising one another for
being wet. The accusation hardly means anything anymore.
It has become a way to express disapproval without saying
what is really on our mind. The Commission could use with
plainer speaking."
May
his soul rest in peace.
When
the CHR failed to take up the burden
Whilst
progress was made at the 59th session of the Commission on
Human Rights, there were also reasons to be pessimistic.
The composition of the Commission's membership
increasingly resembled what Reuters
described as an "abuser solidarity group."
The election of Libya, Syria, China, Cuba and Vietnam, and
the election of the Libyan Ambassador as Chairman by means
of a US-requested secret ballot, all raised preliminary
suspicions as to how effective the Commission could
possibly be. The subsequent politicisation of the
decision-making process, at the expense of genuine human
rights concerns, ended up discrediting the Commission to
such a degree that the High Commissioner for Human Rights
was moved to protest: "... When a charge of
partiality - of failure to recognize the indivisibility of
human rights - destroys a resolution on an important
question, this is not to be celebrated. It is a disaster.
It is a failure to take up the burden. At worst, it may
even be a betrayal of the hopes of people who desperately
need you."
In
the course of the six-week session in 2003, member States
adopted 86 resolutions, 18 decisions, and three
chairperson's statements, as well as reviewing the mandate
of several special thematic and country specific
procedures. Small innovations were notable in certain
resolutions. The resolution on religious intolerance,
which focused on the defamation of Islam, addressed the
concern that Islam was "frequently and wrongly
associated with human rights violations and
terrorism". This focus on one religion divided the
Commission, yet was adopted by a recorded vote of 32 in
favour, 14 against and seven abstentions.
The
resolution on minorities was also positive, praising the
work of the Sub-Commission Working Group on minorities and
requesting the High Commissioner "to examine existing
mechanisms with a view to enhancing their cooperation and
effectiveness and to identify possible gaps in the
protection of the rights of persons belonging to…
minorities". However, little progress was made on the
rights of indigenous peoples, as the definition and the
issue of basic rights of indigenous peoples continued to
divide members. Several Western States contended that the
Working Group should be abolished as its mandate
overlapped with that of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues.
Another
positive development was the establishment of a Working
Group dealing with the question of an optional protocol to
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) establishing an individual
complaints mechanism. The resolution addressed the
consideration of the need for an optional protocol, as
opposed to the drafting of a protocol. It is an
incremental, but nonetheless positive, first step towards
recognising the justiciability of economic, social and
cultural rights.
More
critically, the Commission avoided any meaningful dialogue
on the military invasion of Iraq, rejecting a proposal to
hold a special sitting on 'Human Rights and the
Humanitarian Situation as Consequences of the War' (18 in
favour, 25 against, 7 abstentions), and opting instead to
adopt an ineffectual final day resolution that failed to
address current developments by retroactively condemning
the extensive violations of human rights by the Government
of Iraq. This was a case of political pandering, pure and
simple, best illustrated by the case of the Chilean
delegate, who was fired for his refusal to toe the
government line in supporting the US decision to block
resolutions holding it accountable for its actions in
Iraq.
Following
the failure of the Commission in its 58th session to adopt
a resolution calling upon States to respect fundamental
human rights standards in the struggle against terrorism,
the initiative of several NGOs and the Mexican delegation
led to the adoption of a resolution at the 59th session.
It was a weak resolution, equivalent to a re-iteration of
General Assembly resolution 58/174 on the same subject. No
human rights mechanism has been established to exclusively
address this issue. Again, the US and European States
voted against the resolution.
The
Commission's cultural divergence was most evident in
stalling of the Brazilian delegation's draft resolution on
"Human Rights and Sexual Orientation", formally
condemning discrimination against persons on account of
their sexual orientation, whereby manipulative procedural
stonewalling by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC)
nations, a vow of abstinence by Ireland and four Latin
States (bowing to lobbying by the Holy See), the new
Christian-right consciousness of the US, and supportive
procrastination by the Chairperson ensured that the issue
was sidelined until 2004.
On
the promotion and protection of human rights, the
important role of national institutions was stressed, and
the Commission reiterated the importance of the programme
of advisory services and technical assistance in the field
of human rights. However, it is significant that the
Commission tended towards adopting resolutions under
agenda item 19 ("advisory services") rather than
agenda item 9 ("human rights violations"),
despite the fact that article 19 resolutions are expected
to reflect a 'graduation' for those States that
demonstrate a concerted effort to improve their human
rights record.
During
the 2003 session, African and Asian States, together with
Cuba, repeatedly accused Western States of "politicising"
the work of the Commission by criticising the rights
records of other countries under agenda item 9. There was
increasing opposition to country-specific reports and case
studies presented during debates. Taking recourse to
no-action motions, as they did on the draft resolution
concerning Zimbabwe, African States made it clear that
they would no longer tolerate being called into question
over their human rights records.
Furthermore,
the Commission ended the mandates of the Special
Rapporteurs on Afghanistan, Sudan and former Yugoslavia,
and rejected again all initiatives on Chechnya and Sudan,
terminating the mandate of the Sudan Rapporteur. No new
country specific mandates were created. Regarding thematic
Rapporteurs, political venom was reserved by the US for
Mr. Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur on the right to food,
while the Algerian Ambassador waited until Professor Theo
Van Boven, Rapporteur on torture, had left Geneva before
publicly questioning his integrity and impartiality. In an
unprecedented move, Deputy High Commissioner Bertrand
Ramcharan was compelled to take the floor in Van Boven's
defence .
At
the time of the 2003 session, only 47 of the UN's 191
member States had issued standing invitations to human
rights monitors. Only one African country (Sierra Leone)
and no Asian country had done so. The same African and
Asian governments, which had the majority of votes in the
Commission (27 out of 53 members) opposed country debates,
and undermined the very work of those who they appoint by
refusing them access to their own countries. The attack on
country rapporteurs is expected to be a prelude to the
eventual undermining of thematic Rapporteurs. During the
59th session, a decision proposed by Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia was adopted by 28 votes to 24 (with 1 abstention),
targeting the transmission of communications and urgent
appeals from Rapporteurs to governments. In this decision
2003/113, the Commission requested effective coordination
in the Office of the High Commissioner to "preclude
any overlapping and/or duplication", and to ensure
that communications and urgent appeals be forwarded to the
government concerned "with written authorisation from
the Special Rapporteur". This only succeeds in
slowing down the process of urgent appeals and damaging
their worth.
Procedurally,
notable departures from the previous year included the
establishment of the 'high level segment', allotting time
to heads of government, ministers and so forth to express
the importance of the Commission to their respective
States.
However,
the allocation of the high level segment to the first week
of the Commission meant that important work was delayed
until the second week of the Commission, prompting
observers to suggest that the third week of the Commission
would be more useful to all concerned. Rapporteurs who had
boycotted the Commission on account of their drastically
reduced speaking time in 2002, were given more adequate
time in 2003.
Coupled
with an opportunity to address immediate questions from
the floor, this brought their contributions more to the
centre of the Commission's deliberations. This was a
commendable practice, although restricted by time.
Gauging
from the outcomes of the 59th session, it appeared that
immunity from criticism (or in certain cases, absolution)
could be secured through Commission membership. Regional
bloc alliances and intensive trade-off lobbying meant that
critical draft resolutions such as those on Chechnya,
Zimbabwe and Sudan were defeated. This gerrymandering has
brought increasing despair to previous High Commissioners
for Human Rights, with Sergio De Mello sensing in 2003
that "delegates were losing sight of the noble goal
of protecting human rights" and that "the word
politicisation and all its variants [should] be retired
from active service". Whether the 60th session will
see sense in the recommendation remains to be seen.
‘A
job of passion, in difficult times’
INTERVIEW
Acting
High Commissioner for Human Rights H.E.
Bertrand Ramcharan
Bertrand Ramcharan was
Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights since 1998,
taking over as Acting High Commissioner after High
Commissioner Sergio Vieira de Mello left for Iraq as UN
Special Envoy. Mr. de Mello was later killed in an attack
on the UN headquarters in Baghdad and it fell to Mr.
Ramcharan to rally the Office of the High Commissioner in
its moment of grief, and to keep it running smoothly after
the upheaval. Mr. Ramcharan was previously Adjunct
Professor of International Human Rights Law at Columbia
University and has held a number of posts at the UN,
including at UNPROFOR and in the UN Political Department.
In an interview with Human Rights Features, Mr. Ramcharan spoke of his experiences at the
Office of the High Commissioner, and his expectations from
the Commission…
Human
Rights Features (HRF):
Your special report to the Commission on the human rights
situation in Liberia is a novel step in the history of the
Commission, and you have suggested that this might be a
model that can be built upon. Does this stem from a belief
that the High Commissioner needs to be more proactive in
his/her engagement with the Commission? Have you had any
feedback on the report yet?
H. E. Bertrand
Ramcharan (BR):
Yes, I do believe the High Commissioner should be more
proactive, as you say. On feedback to the Liberia report,
members of the Commission have acknowledged it as an
important precedent. I hope the Commission will react to
it at its coming session.
HRF:
With regard to counter-terrorism legislation, and in
particular, the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC),
what specific steps is your Office planning in terms of
ensuring that the work of the CTC incorporates an
examination of the human rights concerns raised by
anti-terror legislation. Does your Office plan to urge the
CTC to formalise and/or institutionalise the practice of
receiving information on human rights issues - from the
Special Mechanisms, NGOs, or by having human rights
experts interact with the CTC on a regular basis? At the
moment, the system appears to be ad hoc, as it were.
BR: Our
digest of human rights and terrorism was principally
prepared for the CTC. We should continue to develop
cooperation pragmatically.
HRF:
Any concrete plans to push the CTC towards examining State
compliance with international human rights norms in the
course of their work?
BR:
We will certainly continue to nudge them in this
direction.
HRF:
This brings us to the recent questionnaire on National
Protection Systems that was sent out to Governments, of
which about 30 responded. Many of the responses however
appear to be inadequate - the Government of Bangladesh,
for example, is denying that there are any groups or
sections of people at special risk in the country. Does
your Office plan to solicit further information from NGOs
- alternate reports, if you will - and draw from treaty
body observations and reports by the special mechanisms?
BR:
We have begun a process. I hope all Governments will
submit replies. Thereafter, it can develop naturally.
HRF:
You referred recently to the GA's endorsement of the SG's
report on the need to "rationalise and enhance the
effectiveness" of the Special Mechanisms. This is
ominous terminology - as you are aware, it was the "rationalisation"
of the work of the CHR that facilitated the weakening of
the CHR and its mechanisms. It led to the
near-emasculation of the Sub Commission, restrictions on
NGOs, among other things. In view of the attacks on the
special mechanisms - who you admirably defended - during
the previous session
of the Commission, don't you think any attempt at "rationalisation"
runs the risk of playing into the hands of the critics of
the special mechanisms"?
BR:
We at OHCHR have focused on a strengthened support and
methods of work. We have not followed the line of
rationalisation.
HRF:
Drawing from your experiences and the ideas you have set
forth in the past, about having the SG and/or special
rapporteurs brief the Security Council fortnightly about
situations of concern, do you plan to push that agenda
forward during your stint as Acting High Commissioner?
BR:
Yes, very much so. You will see this in my Annual Report
to the Commission.
HRF:
The former High Commissioner, the late Mr. Sergio de
Mello, suggested at the end of last year's session that
the CHR might decide to bring the special procedures and
national institutions into the agenda earlier in order to
give them the attention and importance they deserve. Is it
something your office intends to follow up on? Did it come
up during the drawing up of this year's agenda?
BR:
This is an idea I had advanced and I will certainly
continue to advocate it.
HRF:
With regard to the ongoing debate on criteria - or rather,
'minimum standards', as Mr. de Mello termed it - for
membership of the Commission, have you received any
indications as to how States feel about it? Do you see it
as a workable proposition?
BR:
States are reticent. In my Annual Report, I have advanced
other ideas.
HRF:
High Commissioner, during the last session of the
Commission, non-governmental organisations observed a
conscious attempt by some states to curtail their ability
to fully contribute to the work of the CHR. We understand
that at least two regional groupings seek to renew their
effort in the Bureau to further this NGO unfriendly
agenda. Of some concern is that these very states have
been instrumental in bringing a large number of Government
Organised NGOs, whose sole objective is to muddy the
waters relating to NGO contribution to the work of the CHR.
What will be the role, if any, of your Office to ensure
that NGO participation is not curtailed but enhanced?
BR:
We have been ardently advocating the case for optimum
participation by NGOs, including adequate speaking time.
HRF:
Last year, we saw a plethora of no action resolutions by
some states. Coupled with this is a clear attempt to
discourage any discussion on country-specific mandates.
How do you plan to address this challenge to
accountability?
BR:
This is a matter for States. As a matter of principle, we
must insist on the concept of accountability.
HRF:
Finally, what do you see as your most important
contribution to the work of the OHCHR over the past few
years?
BR:
Keeping the Office focused on its mission;
professionalising it; strengthening the Office internally;
and developing a policy architecture for human rights
protection on the ground.
HRF:
You have been the High Commissioner for a year now. What
has it been like?
BR:
A job of passion, in very difficult times.
HRF:
What do you consider to be your most important
achievement?
BR:
Keeping the Office focused, professional and in
first-class shape during this difficult period.
HRF:
You have submitted key reports to the Security Council,
ECOSOC, the General Assembly and the Commission. What have
you sought to achieve through these reports?
BR:
To sharpen the focus on human rights.
HRF:
You have reacted to a number of situations of gross
violations of human rights through public statements. What
has it been like?
BR:
I have issued some 40 public statements expressing concern
over the past year. I have never shirked from reacting to
a situation.
HRF:
Have you also acted behind the scenes?
BR:
Yes. In numerous instances, I have sought to use human
rights diplomacy for the protection of those at risk. I
have on occasion received warm notes from those on whose
behalf I acted.
HRF:
You have also made quite a few policy statements…
BR:
Yes. I believe I made some 70 such statements in which I
sought to spell out a human rights policy for the future.
HRF:
What are your key messages for the forthcoming Commission?
BR:
In the annual report I have submitted to the Commission, I
have sought to urge them to modernise themselves, to
strengthen protection, to protect the victims of
trafficking and to draft a Convention on human rights
education.
HRF:
Why a Convention on human rights education?
BR:
Because we must sharpen the definition of policy when it
comes to formulating courses and materials on human rights
in local languages. Human rights education is the key to
the future. So is support for the role of judges in the
protection of human rights. This is so very important.
HRF:
A final comment?
BR:
It
has been, for me, "To Serve With Passion".
|

|
 |
CTC:
Counter human rights committee?
The
Counter Terrorism Committee may be undermining States’ duty to protect basic
liberties
"[B]uilding
a durable global human rights culture, by asserting the value and worth of
every human being, is essential if terrorism is to be eliminated." - Mary
Robinson
The
critical issue of protecting human rights whilst countering terrorism is at
the forefront of this year’s meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights.
There is currently no international institution with a mandate to assess
whether measures taken and justified by a State as necessary to combat
terrorism are in violation of its international human rights obligations.
Following endless recommendations, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC),
established by the Security Council, has finally indicated recognition of the
value of incorporating a human rights expert as part its mandate.
State
counter-terrorist measures since 11 September 2001 show a global pattern of
systematic erosion of civil liberties. The arbitrary detention of 600
detainees in Guantanamo Bay, the categorisation of Uighur minorities in China
as "terrorists" and their subsequent executions, the indefinite
detention of non-nationals without charge or trial in the UK, the provision
for immunity from prosecution for officials in India and Russia on the basis
of acting in good faith, the increased use of military tribunals in Egypt to
try civilians, the use of punitive policies against refugees and asylum
seekers, the refoulement of alleged terrorists to jurisdictions where they are
certain to be tortured, and the re-introduction of capital punishment for
terrorist offences in the USA, China, Jordan, India and others, offer a select
testimony to the fact that the disappearance of legal safeguards in the
political post-September 11 climate is not a theoretical concern.
Nor
is it a theoretical concern that the UN to this point has been
bureaucratically incapable of, or its constituent members even intentionally
unwilling to, establish an adequate means to respond to the growing crisis.
Early fears that Security Council resolution 1373's "get going on
effective measures now" message could be exploited to circumvent States'
human rights obligations were well founded. Despite the adoption of Security
Council resolution 1456 (2003), requiring that counter terrorism measures must
be "in accordance with international law, in particular international
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law", haphazard legislation had
already been implemented and routinely employed in many States. The lack of an
international monitoring body has only served to facilitate the continued
abuse of resolution 1373.
Resolution
1373 establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the Council to
"raise the average level of government performance against terrorism
across the globe" by "upgrading the capacity of each nation's
legislation and executive machinery to fight terrorism", left the body to
its own discretion regarding its mandate. Former High Commissioners for Human
Rights Mary Robinson and the late Sergio De Mello expected, at the very least,
that the CTC's work would be directed by the principles of legality, non-derogability,
necessity and proportionality, non-discrimination, due process and rule of
law, and right to seek asylum/non-refoulement.
However,
the CTC stressed from the outset that "monitoring performance against
other international conventions, including human rights law, is outside the
scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee's mandate". In the past, the CTC
has been happy to liaison with human rights experts on an ad hoc basis, and
just as happy to continue to ignore all their recommendations in practice.
Rather
than assess human rights in any capacity, the CTC has in fact been accused on
occasion of undermining States’ protection of human rights safeguards.
Citing the example of Kenya, whose government reportedly came under pressure
to enact legislation modelled on the USA Patriot Act, Global Advocacy Director
of Human Rights Watch Rory Mungoven has accused the CTC of being complicit by
its silence of supporting legislation that violates fundamental principles of
international law.
Human
Rights Committee expert Sir Nigel Rodley, speaking directly to the CTC, went
one step further by noting that the CTC's questions to the State report of
Slovakia "could be understood to be urging the State to overlook the
principles that in no case should a person be sent to a territory where he or
she faces torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or a
violations of the right to life."
This
is the Committee that the UN has entrusted to monitor counter-terrorism
measures "in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N
Charter."
The
CTC expects to leave monitoring to the already under-funded UN treaty and
charter based human rights bodies. The Human Rights Committee has acted
commendably within the confines of its mandate by reviewing ex officio State
party reports to the CTC, and expressing concerns in Egypt, New Zealand,
Sweden and the UK relating to administrative detention without effective
judicial review; expulsion of those at risk of being subjected to torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; retroactive law making; and
restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly. The Committee
Against Torture (CAT) and the Committee On the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) have done likewise in their respective capacities.
However,
these bodies are not capable of examining the complexity of issues on a
sustained basis, collectively or otherwise. Treaty monitoring bodies can only
cover issues relative to their respective treaties, and the reports of States
party to them. This automatically excludes over one quarter of UN member
States in the case of CAT. State party reports are submitted on a periodic
basis, and many are seriously overdue. Furthermore, the Committees are only
capable of considering on average fifteen reports per year. Adding all the
other human rights issues they must address, this hardly amounts to an
immediate and comprehensive response to counter-terrorism measures.
Likewise,
all charter-based mechanisms are severely limited in their capabilities. The
Commission presently suffers from a politicisation that is at odds with the
type of global response required. Special Rapporteurs suffer from what has
been referred to as the "circumscribed and particularised nature of each
mandate", where certain aspects of counter-terrorist activity fall under
the mandates of several different Special Rapporteurs, whilst others are not
covered at all. Moreover, the "more humanitarian than judicial"
nature of certain urgent action procedures and the ineffective means of
following up on recommendations means that the input of Special Rapporteurs
may appear peripheral.
The
Sub-Committee on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights has taken
positive steps in the past, appointing a Special Rapporteur on the question of
terrorism and human rights in 1998. However, Ms. Kallipoli Koufa's mandate is
directed towards a more conceptual analysis of the areas in which terrorism,
rather than counter-terrorism, affects the full enjoyment of human rights. In
August 2003 the Sub-Commission tabled the creation of a working group to
examine counter-terrorism measures. A welcome addition, this is however only
at the draft resolution stage, and will not come before the Sub-Commission
until August 2004.
Considerably
more is required. Firstly, a Special Rapporteur must be appointed at the
Commission level to monitor and investigate the compatibility of
counter-terrorism measures through in situ country visits and correspondence.
Its mandate must cover the use of emergency laws; vague definitions of
"terrorism" designed to suppress freedom of expression, association,
assembly, religion, and movement; the use of unlawful force; torture and other
forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; unlawful detention; due
process and fair trial; methods of search and seizure; protection from
refoulement; discrimination; and the right to effective remedy. The
Rapporteur's goals should be to identify and highlight areas of concern,
request explanations to State practices, and identify methods of best
practice.
The
relationship between the CTC and the OHCHR needs to be formalised and
strengthened. To date, the OHCHR talks and the CTC pretends to listen, but
carries on regardless. In view of the global pattern of counter terrorist
measures, increased co-operation with regional and national bodies also needs
to be strengthened. At the recent Asia Pacific Forum for National Human Rights
Institutions, it was suggested by the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network that
member national institutions should be requested to submit their findings on
counter-terrorism measures to the OHCHR, which in turn would forward these
reports, with additional recommendations, to the CTC. This initiative was
welcomed by the representative of the OHCHR, and would be an invaluable
resource to any human rights expert appointed to the CTC.
But
it is to the higher echelons of the United Nations that the issue must also be
taken. A recent open briefing of the Security Council on 4 March 2004,
discussing the "urgent and absolutely necessary” need to revamp the CTC,
addressed the need to establish a new 'counter-terrorism directorate' which
would expand the CTC's team of technical experts. Following suggestions
presented in a letter to the Council by CTC Chairman Inocencio Arias on 19
February, a core bloc of Latin American and European countries supported the
immediate need for the appointment of a human rights expert.
According
to Richard Ryan, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, speaking on
behalf of the European Union, there "could be no trade off between human
rights and effective counter-terrorism measures" and this required not
only the appointment of a human rights expert but also a provision for direct
liaising between the proposed Directorate and the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights. Regrettably, permanent Council members the
US, UK, France, China and Russia all remained silent on the subject of human
rights. This debate will be resumed after the 60th Session of the Commission
on Human Rights.
These
constitute the minimum immediate requirements for an effective assessment of
State compliance. The "urgency and indispensability" of these
requirements cannot be understated, as, to quote Kofi Annan on his address to
the Security Council in January 2003: "[W]e must never lose sight of the
fact that any sacrifice of freedom or the rule of law within States … is to
hand the terrorists a victory that no act of theirs alone could possibly
bring."
Treaty
compliance: Big democracy fails test
The
first of a two-part series looks at India’s compliance with the ICCPR,
ICESCR and ICERD
|
INDIA |
Treaty
Compliance-I
|
On
paper, the Indian Government's commitment to the human rights standards
enunciated in several key international instruments is exemplary. It has
acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), indicating its willingness to be bound by the treaties
in international law.
However,
the reality of India's human rights record reveals that this formal
affirmation of human rights is deceptive. The same fundamental rights that the
State has pledged to protect in the three aforementioned treaties continue to
be routinely violated through the application of particular laws and the
actions of State authorities. This disparity between the rhetoric and practice
of the Indian Government is disturbing. It calls into question whether the
Government's ratification of the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the ICERD is motivated
by a genuine commitment to human rights, or the need to divert international
scrutiny from the plight of its citizens.
The
Caste System
Caste-based
discrimination remains endemic in Indian society. The groups occupying the
lowest echelons of the caste system, particularly the Dalits or the Scheduled
Castes, are regularly denied basic political, economic, social and cultural
rights. The range of abuses to which they are subjected include torture,
restrictions on their freedom of movement, and forced participation in such
degrading tasks as manual scavenging.
In
spite of the fact that this constitutes a clear derogation from the provisions
of the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the ICERD, the Indian Government has sought to
frame caste-based discrimination as a social issue of purely domestic concern,
rather than a human rights problem warranting international attention. This
argument ignores indications that comparable kinds of discrimination exist in
numerous countries in Asia and Africa. Even so, the Indian Government was
successful in ensuring caste-based discrimination was omitted from the agenda
of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
All Related Forms of Intolerance, held in late 2001.
However,
this reasoning has been unequivocally rejected by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the monitoring body established under
the Convention. The Committee has recognised caste-based discrimination as a
form of discrimination based on descent and has passed a general
recommendation reiterating this view, putting the question of the scope of the
ICERD beyond doubt.
The
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The
rights of indigenous peoples are enshrined in various provisions of the ICERD,
the ICCPR and the ICESCR. In particular, the right of all peoples to
self-determination is recognised in Articles 1 of both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR. Contrary to these provisions, the Indian Government has acted to
suppress movements for self-determination and has adopted a policy of
preserving national integrity at all costs. Although the Indian Government
ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR with reservations in respect of those Articles,
this does not diminish the seriousness of the abuses systematically inflicted
upon its indigenous populations.
The
tribal people of Northeast India, for example, have suffered economic
deprivation, social and cultural oppression and have been the victims of a
discriminatory application of emergency laws such as the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act. Section 4(a) of the AFSPA provides that any commissioned officer
or a person of equivalent rank in the Armed Forces is empowered to shoot to
kill after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary.
The
4th International Conference of the International Alliance of Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests held in Nairobi in 2002 took note of
the Indian Government's policies that stifle the aspirations of the indigenous
people of the Northeast through laws legitimising the brutalisation of the
people in the region. The Conference was also vocal in its criticism of the
'development projects' instigated by the Indian Government, which result in
the large-scale displacement of thousands of tribals from their ancestral
land.
The
Rights of Religious Minorities
Instances
of the complicity of State agents in the persecution of religious minorities
in India continue to undermine the Government's purported commitment to the
protections contained in the ICERD. In the aftermath of the Gujarat riots in
early 2002, overwhelming evidence emerged implicating members of the police
force in the violence against Muslims. Furthermore, collusion between police
and Government officials to protect the perpetrators of the violence from
prosecution was reportedly widespread.
Far
from being an aberration in the behaviour of State officials, the tendency of
law enforcement agencies to side with the Hindu majority in communal riots has
been publicly acknowledged for some time. Indeed, the 1981 Report of the
National Police Commission admitted to such a bias in the operations of its
police officers.
The
uncertain predicament of religious minorities in India is also apparent in the
passage of anti-conversion laws in the early 1990s. Although ostensibly
secular in purpose, the laws in fact operate to reinforce the dominance of the
Hindu majority.
The
Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance shared this conclusion, reporting
in 1992 on the forced conversions of Christians to Hinduism in the state of
Madhya Pradesh, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party which governed the State at
the time. The same trend is apparent in more recent legislation enacted by the
state government in Tamil Nadu and the Government of the state of Gujarat.
Reporting
Obligations
In
light of the range of human rights violations in India that contravene
provisions of the ICERD, it is unsurprising that the Indian Government has
been reluctant to submit its compliance reports to the CERD. It submitted its
16th and 17th reports after receiving four and three reminders from the
Committee respectively.
The
Death Penalty
In
spite of its obligation under Article 6(6) of the ICCPR to work towards the
abolition of the death penalty, the Indian Government has signalled its
movement in the opposite direction by broadening the applicability of the
death penalty as a punishment for 'terrorist acts' in its recent
counter-terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2001.
Furthermore,
the Government is yet to amend the Indian Penal Code to ensure that persons
are not executed for crimes committed when they were under the age of
eighteen, in line with the requirements of Article 6(5) of the ICCPR. In
conjunction with its reticence on the issue of signing the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, this suggests a lack of good faith on the part of the
Indian Government in its efforts to comply with the provisions of the ICCPR.
Rights
in a State of Emergency
Although
Article 4 of the ICCPR allows for the suspension of some of the rights
contained in the Covenant in times of 'public emergency', it does not allow
derogation from designated fundamental human rights under any circumstances.
Several
pieces of legislation enacted by the Indian Government clearly fall foul of
this provision, including the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the National
Security Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. None of these Acts were
enacted in an officially proclaimed emergency. Of greater concern, however, is
their authorisation of measures such as arbitrary detention and other
infringements upon fundamental human rights standards expressly prohibited by
the ICCPR.
The
Government has invoked the threat to India's security posed by terrorist
organisations to justify the passage of such draconian legislation. However,
it is clear that anti-terrorist legislation that does not conform with human
rights standards only serves to perpetuate the violation of human rights
rather than redress the violations of human rights committed by terrorist
acts.
Official
Immunity
Both
the ICCPR (in Article 2(3)) and the ICERD (in Article 6) enunciate the need
for an effective remedy to be available to victims of human rights abuses.
However, section 6 of India's Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act grants members
of the armed forces immunity from prosecution. Given the regular allegations
of human rights violations committed by India's Border Security Forces in the
past, this amounts to a denial of justice and redress in the form of
compensation to significant numbers of people.
Monitoring
and Complaints Procedures under the ICCPR
The
ICCPR provides for two complaints procedures - one available to individuals
under the First Optional Protocol, and one available to States under Article
41 of the Covenant. However, the Indian Government has failed to consent to
either of these mechanisms, depriving its citizens of an important alternative
avenue of redress against the State.
States
that have acceded to the ICCPR are also expected to submit periodic reports to
the Human Rights Committee detailing its compliance with the Covenants
requirements. Each of the reports India has submitted thus far have been late,
and the Committee is currently awaiting India's fourth report which was due in
2001.
The
Indian Government's reports have often been criticised for focusing on
describing the legal safeguards in place to protect human rights, rather than
the practical effectiveness of their implementation.
The
Right to Food
Article
11 of the ICESCR enshrines the right to food as a basic human right. The
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights elaborated on this issue by
noting in its 29th Session that 'the roots of the problem of hunger…are not
lack of food but lack of access to available food…'
This
is the context in which the right to food in India must be viewed. The
Government often emphasises the country's transition from an agrarian
deficiency to an agrarian surplus. However, this does not address the problem
of the lack of a basic food supply to close to 400 million people, while the
surplus rots in Government godowns. In a positive development however, the
Supreme Court of India has passed orders asking the authorities in numerous
states to ensure that families below the poverty line are provided with
adequate food. The court has also undertaken to monitor the implementation of
the orders. However, it is alarming that the right to food is only receiving
recognition on account of an activist judiciary. It is clearly still
imperative that the Government intervene to address this crisis.
The
Right to Housing and Health
Article
11(1) of the ICESCR recognises a right to housing as part of the right to an
adequate standard of living. There is also an emerging global consensus
towards a stronger recognition of an individual's housing rights.
Contrary
to this, the Indian Government - far from recognising any concrete right to
housing - is busy rendering more and more people homeless. For example, in NBA
v. Union of India, despite being briefed about the lack of adequate
resettlement for the people that would be displaced, the court authorised the
Sardar Sarovar Project observing that '...displacement of the tribals and
other persons would not per se result in the violation of their fundamental or
other rights…'. Furthermore, in a recent order the Supreme Court permitted
further raising of the dam that would displace more people with no prospect
for rehabilitation, again despite the opinion forwarded by the Special
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing to the contrary.
Measures
to promote better health are also being increasingly viewed as part of the
duty of the Government arising out of the corresponding human right to health
reflected in Article 12 of the ICESCR. General Comment 14 of the Committee for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that the right to health requires
availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality with regard to both
health care and the underlying preconditions of health. The main problem in
India is the existence of a privatised and unregulated health care system. The
profit motive inherent in the operation of a private health system means that
healthcare is unaffordable for most poor citizens. The result is a massive
disparity in healthcare available for the poor as opposed to the rich.
Conclusion
A
cursory glance at India's human rights record exposes the Government's failure
to translate its rhetoric in international fora into concrete domestic
safeguards for human rights. India's most vulnerable citizens, principally the
poor, and ethnic and religious minorities, continue to suffer from human
rights violations that impinge upon the whole spectrum of their rights -
political, economic, social and cultural. The Indian Government must dedicate
on-going time and resources to the implementation of its human rights
obligations. Otherwise, its ratification of international treaties will
continue to be regarded as little more than a disingenuous exercise in
international diplomacy.
With
the Asian bloc helpfully pitching in, African countries thwarted the
resolution against Zimbabwe last year. The EU will need to work the corridors
strenuously if it wants a resolution passed this year...
Zimbabwe
is at crisis point. With unemployment rising, incomes and foreign investment
falling and an inflation rate of over 500 percent, the country is facing a
severe food shortage which has left over 5.5 million people in need of food
aid. The country's previously healthy agricultural industry, which once served
as a food exporter to its poorer neighbors, has been destroyed, in part due to
drought but mainly by President Mugabe's controversial land reforms.
Yet,
not only must Zimbabweans contend with a food emergency and a deteriorating
economy, they are also faced with a deteriorating human rights situation, as
President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) continue to suppress all forms of opposition to his regime.
According
to the US Department of State report on human rights practices in Zimbabwe in
2003, there has been a systematic government-sanctioned, campaign of violence
targeting supporters and potential supporters of the government's main
opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC faces
significant intimidation, and during 2003, the police arrested 17 out of the
53 of the MDC's Members of Parliament, some on more than one occasion. MDC
president Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested twice in June and faces charges that
include treason for allegedly plotting the assassination of President Mugabe.
The
Official Secrets Act and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which grant
a wide range of powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes
that are not clearly defined, have been gratuitously applied to suppress
freedom of expression and movement and to silence all forms of political
opposition. Human Rights Watch reports that the work of NGOs is also being
progressively more controlled and suppressed through the use of POSA.
The
police repeatedly used force to break up nonviolent demonstrations and to
prevent public gatherings from taking place. In October, the Commission on
Human Rights' Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right
to freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo; the Chairperson-Rapporteur
of the Commission's Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Leila Zerroügui,
and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights
defenders, Hina Jilani, expressed concern regarding the arrest of more than
forty trade unionists during a national protest demonstration.
In
November, the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement
expressing his concern regarding reports that more than 100 trade unionists
and civil leaders had been arrested on 18 November 2003 during a protest
demonstration in the capital Harare. The Government has also repressed the
work of journalists and media organisations through the use of restrictive
legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA).
In
September, the privately-owned Daily News was closed for failing to fulfill
registration requirements under the AIPPA. The police have ignored subsequent
Court rulings authorising the Daily News to re-open and ordering the police to
vacate the premises.
The
Government controls all domestic radio broadcasting, and most newspapers
practice self-censorship due to government intimidation and fear of
prosecution for libel. Foreign journalists were frequently denied visas to
enter the country, and in May the Government deported an American journalist
after he wrote about the political situation in the country.
The
Government has made numerous attempts to subvert the independence of the
judiciary, applying intense political pressure on judges and repeatedly
refusing to abide by judicial decisions. On 24 September 2002 and 19 February
2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
expressed grave concern over the criminal charges brought against two
Zimbabwean judges and their implications on judicial independence and the rule
of law in Zimbabwe.
The
Government's famine relief operation, managed by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB),
has been accused of diverting food aid to supporters of the ZANU-PF. According
to Human Rights Watch, those responsible for drawing up the lists of the needy
are under instructions to exclude all MDC supporters and residents of former
commercial farms resettled under the country's "fast-track" land
reform program.
The
National Youth Service program, initiated by the Government in 2001 to promote
patriotism, has been used to create youth militias trained to kill and
torture. The government youth militias have been accused of torturing, beating
and raping opponents of the government. There have also been allegations of
the systematic rape of young girls at national youth service training camps,
reportedly as "part of the training". Students entering college,
teacher training schools or the civil service must have undergone training in
the youth program.
Mugabe's
Ploy: Blame Neocolonialism
When
faced with criticism regarding his Government's human rights abuses, Mugabe
claims to be a victim of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy to prevent him from
divesting white farmers of their vast holdings. Mugabe blames the country's
collapsing economy and escalating law and order problem on a sinister alliance
of Britain, white farmers and assorted 'traitors' who are conspiring to
reverse the country's independence.
Mugabe's
strategy of turning the issue into a black vs white dispute was again
exemplified in December 2003. Following the decision to renew Zimbabwe's
suspension from the Commonwealth due to the rigged presidential elections in
2002, Mugabe terminated Zimbabwe's membership of the Commonwealth and
described the Commonwealth's decision, promoted by Britain and Australia, as
"pure racism".
Whilst
it is clear that Mugabe's controversial land reforms policy has been a factor
in the escalating human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, Western countries have been
wary of focusing on the issue in the CHR, lest they play into the hands of
Mugabe. Both of the European Union's previous draft resolutions on Zimbabwe
have failed to recommend any concrete measures to address the issue of land
reform. However, the CHR should not be swayed by political arguments on
Zimbabwe and should condemn the growing incidence of human rights violations
in the country.
Debacle
of the 58th and 59th CHR Sessions
The
European Union failed in its previous attempts to bring a resolution against
Zimbabwe at the CHR in 2002 and 2003. On both occasions, President Mugabe
succeeded in his ploy of convincing members of both the African and Asian
Groups that the main purpose of the draft resolutions was not to protect human
rights, but instead was a politically motivated attempt at neocolonialism.
In
2003, the representative of South Africa, speaking on behalf of the African
Group, criticised the European Union's stance as being "politically
motivated", claiming that the text of the draft resolution "lacked
the requisite balance between civil and political rights on the one hand and
economic, social and cultural rights on the other. Closer inspection revealed
that the draft resolution's sponsors did not fully understand Zimbabwe's
history, or were choosing to ignore it for reasons of political
expediency."
On
both occasions the resolutions were scuttled by procedural no-action motions
as the Group of African States, together with members of the Asian Group,
voted to obstruct the resolution, and prevented the Commission from debating
the subject matter of the resolutions.
A
glimmer of hope for the 60th session?
The
economic sanctions imposed upon Zimbabwe by the European Union were renewed
and extended earlier this year, and the European Parliament has again called
upon the European Union to sponsor a resolution on Zimbabwe. What remains to
be seen is whether Mugabe will again succeed in burying the pressing issue of
human rights violations in Zimbabwe under a mountain of political rhetoric.
In
this era of the "war against terrorism", when the political will to
fight human rights violations is diminishing in western countries, it is vital
that the European Union take an active and vigorous role in gathering support
for a resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. The member
countries of the European Union would do well to recall the active campaigning
of Zimbabwe and other African countries prior to the no-action motion last
year.
Prior
to any decision to vote as a bloc to obstruct a resolution on Zimbabwe,
African Nations should look beyond the politics of land reform and let
Zimbabwe's human rights record speak for itself.
Zimbabwe's
neighbours must remember that protecting the rights of the citizens of
Zimbabwe is essential not only for the stability and security in Zimbabwe, but
for the region as well.
|
Reign of Terror |
|
MORE than 18,000 students
have graduated from the National Youth Service Program in Zimbabwe since
its inception in 2001. The programme, purportedly a voluntary training
program for instilling a feeling of nationalism in the Zimbabwean youth
in the age group of 10-30 years, has become a compulsory paramilitary
training ground. The Mugabe government has consistently denied
allegations of forcing the youth to compulsorily join these youth
service camps.
The youth militia, also
known as the "green bombers" have been accused of several
human rights violations including murder, rape and torture. They have
been openly used by the Mugabe government as a tool to terrorise the
Zimbabwean people, especially the opposition activists.
Apart from committing
atrocities on their fellow peoples, the youth militia have themselves
been subjected to various human rights abuses at the training camps. The
camps impart military training to children as young as eleven years of
age, thereby creating child soldiers.
The
female youth militia have reported systematic rape and sexual abuse in
these training camps as a part of the training process. |
|

|
 |
Derogating
from justice
Faustian
British bargain attempts to trade fundamental liberties for national security
Decades
after seeing preventative detention fail in Northern Ireland, the British
Government is at it again. In the name of national security, the United
Kingdom's anti-terrorism legislation grants extraordinary executive powers of
indefinite detention that contradict both international human rights law and
the core values of Britain's own legal heritage.
The
British Parliament debated and enacted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act ("ATCSA") in the months following the September 11 attacks. The
Act contains a panoply of provisions in the name of combating terrorism. This
article focuses on Part IV of the Act, which returns preventive detention to
the British statute books. Part IV allows the Home Secretary (Mr David
Blunkett MP) to order the indefinite detention of any foreign national whom he
believes to be a terrorist and a risk to national security. Specifically, the
Part is intended to allow the indefinite detention of any foreign national
who, for either practical or legal reasons, cannot be deported to any foreign
country (for example, because that person may have a well-founded fear of
persecution upon return).
This
power does not exist in name alone. The British Government arrested and
detained the first eight suspected terrorists within days of the legislation's
enactment. At the time of
writing, the Home Secretary has detained 16 foreign nationals under the Act,
of whom 14 remain in detention and two have left the country (for France and
Morocco). One further foreign national has been certified for detention, but
is currently detained under other legal powers.
In detaining these men - without trial and with limited right of review
- the British Government has abandoned long-standing obligations under
international, European and British law.
The
Right to Liberty
In
Woolmington's Case of 1935, the
British Lord Chancellor Lord Sankey famously wrote: "Throughout the web
of the English Criminal Law, one golden thread is always to be seen, that it
is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt..."
This
principle - the presumption of innocence - has underpinned the rights of
citizens and foreign nationals alike in Britain for hundreds of years. It has
long been understood that to make extended criminal detention conditional on
the state proving its case in open court is to ensure a vital check on a power
that can be misused by even the best intentioned government.
The
Home Secretary has argued, "if we know there is a threat...we need to be
able to ensure that we can continue to protect ourselves from the conspiracy
to act." This argument is utterly disingenuous - for conspiracy to commit
an unlawful act is itself a recognised offence before British law. What the
Secretary defends is not the ability to act against known conspirators (for
the Crown has that power already) but rather the power to detain people
indefinitely upon a mere suspicion - without confidently knowing whether they
pose a threat at all. The Secretary argues that "[i]n such circumstances,
the evidential thresholds for action have to be acceptable in a
democracy..." - but this is
precisely the point. Judicial independence - including unwavering commitment
to the presumption of innocence - lies at the very foundation of the liberal
democratic ideal. The only "evidential thresholds for action" that
are truly "acceptable in a democracy" are those that require the
state |