Special Weekly Edition for the Duration of the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights

(Geneva, 15 March 2004 - 23 April 2004) 

ISSN: 1541-2482

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Volume 7, Issue 1

15-21 March 2004

 

 

Is human rights on the agenda?

 

 

The 60th session of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) begins not very differently from last year's session. With the echoes of the dastardly Madrid bomb blasts still ringing in delegates' ears, the issue of 'terrorism vs human rights' is likely to remain centrestage, and some delegations are no doubt asking themselves why they are here, talking about human rights in the first place.

Except that States are fundamentally wrong to assume that anti-terror measures must necessarily be in contradiction with human rights. Human Rights Features has consistently held that special measures may sometimes be necessary to counter terrorism, with the rider that such measures must be temporary and in conformity with judicial due process norms. Fundamental liberties, such as the right not to be tortured, cannot be eroded. The past year however has seen no let-up in States' willingness to bend these principles. This is reflected in the reports of the CHR's special mechanisms and studies on the ground by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) all over the world.

Now is the time for the CHR to affirm the reason for which it was created - to guarantee respect for fundamental rights in general, but particularly in times of crisis, when they seem unimportant in the greater scheme of things such as 'national security'. As discussed elsewhere in this issue, this could involve the setting up of mechanisms of interaction with the Counter Terrorism Committee, and establishing national mechanisms to report on the human rights implications of anti-terror legislation. (see article in this issue titled “CTC: Counter human rights committee?”)

CHR observers are unable to be optimistic about the outcomes of the current session, with good reason. A case in point is the meeting on Regional Arrangements for the Asia Pacific region, organised earlier this month by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Doha, Qatar. Diplomats from the region were in their element, watering down progressive drafts, effectively carrying out a dry run ahead of the CHR session. A delegate from Myanmar went so far as to suggest that the meeting be wound up early so that he - and presumably, other delegates - could squeeze in a round of golf!

Other disturbing nuggets of information were revealed, unofficially – chiefly relating to new, improved attempts to whittle away at the CHR's role and functioning through the insidious process of "rationalisation". Well-meaning member States, and observers, including NGOs, would do well to carefully monitor the Asian group's activities, in particular, attempts to alter the text of Resolution 110 relating to "Improvement of the work of the session".

The European Parliament's resolution on the European Union's rights, priorities and recommendations for the 60th CHR session calls on the EU to sponsor or co-sponsor resolutions on an impressive list of countries, including China, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, the Israeli Occupied Territories and the area under the Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Côte d´Ivoire, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chechnya, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It also notably calls for resolutions on India (in particular, the situation in Gujarat), Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Good intentions, however, are all very well. Its attempts to push through resolutions on Chechnya and Zimbabwe last year during the 59th session floundered because EU delegations failed to work the corridors. Any attempt to defeat the Like Minded nexus would need strong support from other groups and the fence-sitters. But, as we know, the EU watched miserably as the resolutions faltered and died.

The EU, furthermore, needs to fight the inclination to be cautious with respect to States like India. EU-India dialogues have included few references to human rights, and the ones that did find their way into joint statements were empty shells, devoid of specifics. The European Parliament has recommended that the EU sponsor or co-sponsor a resolution on India on the situation in Gujarat. As it stands, there are no indications to suggest that the EU can summon the necessary courage and consensus to ensure, if not a resolution, at the very least a paragraph in its joint statement, on the continuing lack of accountability in Gujarat. Nonetheless, the duty to bring the issue forward remains with the EU, particularly since India and the EU are "natural partners" in the words of former EU commissioner Chris Patten.

The United States is expected to introduce resolutions against China and Cuba. The first is a result of pressure from within the US to take note of the increasing reports of human rights abuses in China. It has come with the realisation that trade relations, by themselves, do not guarantee respect for basic liberties, and while there is not much hope for the resolution, it is for the US and other countries to keep the pressure on Beijing. While they are at it, the US delegation would do well to tell allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan what it really thinks of their rights records.

With regard to Cuba, it is time for the Latin American countries to retrieve their heads from the sand and take a good, long look at the indulgences they allow their neighbour. While the Latin American group puts up a spirited show against the rights records of other countries, it has shockingly allowed Cuba a further three-year run at the CHR. The Cuban delegation will now have more time to do what it does best: chip away at every progressive initiative at the CHR, assisted by its Like-Minded friends.

Finally, the assault on the CHR's special procedures looks set to continue. The first signs have already emerged, with China taking umbrage at the methods followed by the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, who produced an excellent report, tearing down every myth that China had built around itself regarding its commitment to economic rights. And Israel added its bit by firing a broadside at the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.

It is time to bring human rights back onto the agenda. And to discard the tiresome debates and accusations of "politicisation", probably the most frequently used word at the CHR. As the late Sergio de Mello stated at the close of the 59th session, "For some to accuse others of being political is a bit like fish criticising one another for being wet. The accusation hardly means anything anymore. It has become a way to express disapproval without saying what is really on our mind. The Commission could use with plainer speaking."

May his soul rest in peace.


When the CHR failed to take up the burden

Whilst progress was made at the 59th session of the Commission on Human Rights, there were also reasons to be pessimistic. The composition of the Commission's membership increasingly resembled what Reuters described as an "abuser solidarity group." The election of Libya, Syria, China, Cuba and Vietnam, and the election of the Libyan Ambassador as Chairman by means of a US-requested secret ballot, all raised preliminary suspicions as to how effective the Commission could possibly be. The subsequent politicisation of the decision-making process, at the expense of genuine human rights concerns, ended up discrediting the Commission to such a degree that the High Commissioner for Human Rights was moved to protest: "... When a charge of partiality - of failure to recognize the indivisibility of human rights - destroys a resolution on an important question, this is not to be celebrated. It is a disaster. It is a failure to take up the burden. At worst, it may even be a betrayal of the hopes of people who desperately need you."

In the course of the six-week session in 2003, member States adopted 86 resolutions, 18 decisions, and three chairperson's statements, as well as reviewing the mandate of several special thematic and country specific procedures. Small innovations were notable in certain resolutions. The resolution on religious intolerance, which focused on the defamation of Islam, addressed the concern that Islam was "frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism". This focus on one religion divided the Commission, yet was adopted by a recorded vote of 32 in favour, 14 against and seven abstentions.

The resolution on minorities was also positive, praising the work of the Sub-Commission Working Group on minorities and requesting the High Commissioner "to examine existing mechanisms with a view to enhancing their cooperation and effectiveness and to identify possible gaps in the protection of the rights of persons belonging to… minorities". However, little progress was made on the rights of indigenous peoples, as the definition and the issue of basic rights of indigenous peoples continued to divide members. Several Western States contended that the Working Group should be abolished as its mandate overlapped with that of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

Another positive development was the establishment of a Working Group dealing with the question of an optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) establishing an individual complaints mechanism. The resolution addressed the consideration of the need for an optional protocol, as opposed to the drafting of a protocol. It is an incremental, but nonetheless positive, first step towards recognising the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights.

More critically, the Commission avoided any meaningful dialogue on the military invasion of Iraq, rejecting a proposal to hold a special sitting on 'Human Rights and the Humanitarian Situation as Consequences of the War' (18 in favour, 25 against, 7 abstentions), and opting instead to adopt an ineffectual final day resolution that failed to address current developments by retroactively condemning the extensive violations of human rights by the Government of Iraq. This was a case of political pandering, pure and simple, best illustrated by the case of the Chilean delegate, who was fired for his refusal to toe the government line in supporting the US decision to block resolutions holding it accountable for its actions in Iraq.

Following the failure of the Commission in its 58th session to adopt a resolution calling upon States to respect fundamental human rights standards in the struggle against terrorism, the initiative of several NGOs and the Mexican delegation led to the adoption of a resolution at the 59th session. It was a weak resolution, equivalent to a re-iteration of General Assembly resolution 58/174 on the same subject. No human rights mechanism has been established to exclusively address this issue. Again, the US and European States voted against the resolution.

The Commission's cultural divergence was most evident in stalling of the Brazilian delegation's draft resolution on "Human Rights and Sexual Orientation", formally condemning discrimination against persons on account of their sexual orientation, whereby manipulative procedural stonewalling by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) nations, a vow of abstinence by Ireland and four Latin States (bowing to lobbying by the Holy See), the new Christian-right consciousness of the US, and supportive procrastination by the Chairperson ensured that the issue was sidelined until 2004.   

On the promotion and protection of human rights, the important role of national institutions was stressed, and the Commission reiterated the importance of the programme of advisory services and technical assistance in the field of human rights. However, it is significant that the Commission tended towards adopting resolutions under agenda item 19 ("advisory services") rather than agenda item 9 ("human rights violations"), despite the fact that article 19 resolutions are expected to reflect a 'graduation' for those States that demonstrate a concerted effort to improve their human rights record.

During the 2003 session, African and Asian States, together with Cuba, repeatedly accused Western States of "politicising" the work of the Commission by criticising the rights records of other countries under agenda item 9. There was increasing opposition to country-specific reports and case studies presented during debates. Taking recourse to no-action motions, as they did on the draft resolution concerning Zimbabwe, African States made it clear that they would no longer tolerate being called into question over their human rights records.

Furthermore, the Commission ended the mandates of the Special Rapporteurs on Afghanistan, Sudan and former Yugoslavia, and rejected again all initiatives on Chechnya and Sudan, terminating the mandate of the Sudan Rapporteur. No new country specific mandates were created. Regarding thematic Rapporteurs, political venom was reserved by the US for Mr. Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur on the right to food, while the Algerian Ambassador waited until Professor Theo Van Boven, Rapporteur on torture, had left Geneva before publicly questioning his integrity and impartiality. In an unprecedented move, Deputy High Commissioner Bertrand Ramcharan was compelled to take the floor in Van Boven's defence .

At the time of the 2003 session, only 47 of the UN's 191 member States had issued standing invitations to human rights monitors. Only one African country (Sierra Leone) and no Asian country had done so. The same African and Asian governments, which had the majority of votes in the Commission (27 out of 53 members) opposed country debates, and undermined the very work of those who they appoint by refusing them access to their own countries. The attack on country rapporteurs is expected to be a prelude to the eventual undermining of thematic Rapporteurs. During the 59th session, a decision proposed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was adopted by 28 votes to 24 (with 1 abstention), targeting the transmission of communications and urgent appeals from Rapporteurs to governments. In this decision 2003/113, the Commission requested effective coordination in the Office of the High Commissioner to "preclude any overlapping and/or duplication", and to ensure that communications and urgent appeals be forwarded to the government concerned "with written authorisation from the Special Rapporteur". This only succeeds in slowing down the process of urgent appeals and damaging their worth.

Procedurally, notable departures from the previous year included the establishment of the 'high level segment', allotting time to heads of government, ministers and so forth to express the importance of the Commission to their respective States.

However, the allocation of the high level segment to the first week of the Commission meant that important work was delayed until the second week of the Commission, prompting observers to suggest that the third week of the Commission would be more useful to all concerned. Rapporteurs who had boycotted the Commission on account of their drastically reduced speaking time in 2002, were given more adequate time in 2003.

Coupled with an opportunity to address immediate questions from the floor, this brought their contributions more to the centre of the Commission's deliberations. This was a commendable practice, although restricted by time.

Gauging from the outcomes of the 59th session, it appeared that immunity from criticism (or in certain cases, absolution) could be secured through Commission membership. Regional bloc alliances and intensive trade-off lobbying meant that critical draft resolutions such as those on Chechnya, Zimbabwe and Sudan were defeated. This gerrymandering has brought increasing despair to previous High Commissioners for Human Rights, with Sergio De Mello sensing in 2003 that "delegates were losing sight of the noble goal of protecting human rights" and that "the word politicisation and all its variants [should] be retired from active service". Whether the 60th session will see sense in the recommendation remains to be seen.


‘A job of passion, in difficult times’

INTERVIEW

 Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights H.E. Bertrand Ramcharan

Bertrand Ramcharan was Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights since 1998, taking over as Acting High Commissioner after High Commissioner Sergio Vieira de Mello left for Iraq as UN Special Envoy. Mr. de Mello was later killed in an attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad and it fell to Mr. Ramcharan to rally the Office of the High Commissioner in its moment of grief, and to keep it running smoothly after the upheaval. Mr. Ramcharan was previously Adjunct Professor of International Human Rights Law at Columbia University and has held a number of posts at the UN, including at UNPROFOR and in the UN Political Department.

In an interview with Human Rights Features, Mr. Ramcharan spoke of his experiences at the Office of the High Commissioner, and his expectations from the Commission… 

Human Rights Features (HRF): Your special report to the Commission on the human rights situation in Liberia is a novel step in the history of the Commission, and you have suggested that this might be a model that can be built upon. Does this stem from a belief that the High Commissioner needs to be more proactive in his/her engagement with the Commission? Have you had any feedback on the report yet?

H. E. Bertrand Ramcharan (BR): Yes, I do believe the High Commissioner should be more proactive, as you say. On feedback to the Liberia report, members of the Commission have acknowledged it as an important precedent. I hope the Commission will react to it at its coming session.

HRF: With regard to counter-terrorism legislation, and in particular, the work of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), what specific steps is your Office planning in terms of ensuring that the work of the CTC incorporates an examination of the human rights concerns raised by anti-terror legislation. Does your Office plan to urge the CTC to formalise and/or institutionalise the practice of receiving information on human rights issues - from the Special Mechanisms, NGOs, or by having human rights experts interact with the CTC on a regular basis? At the moment, the system appears to be ad hoc, as it were.

BR: Our digest of human rights and terrorism was principally prepared for the CTC. We should continue to develop cooperation pragmatically.

HRF: Any concrete plans to push the CTC towards examining State compliance with international human rights norms in the course of their work?

BR: We will certainly continue to nudge them in this direction.

HRF: This brings us to the recent questionnaire on National Protection Systems that was sent out to Governments, of which about 30 responded. Many of the responses however appear to be inadequate - the Government of Bangladesh, for example, is denying that there are any groups or sections of people at special risk in the country. Does your Office plan to solicit further information from NGOs - alternate reports, if you will - and draw from treaty body observations and reports by the special mechanisms?

BR: We have begun a process. I hope all Governments will submit replies. Thereafter, it can develop naturally.

HRF: You referred recently to the GA's endorsement of the SG's report on the need to "rationalise and enhance the effectiveness" of the Special Mechanisms. This is ominous terminology - as you are aware, it was the "rationalisation" of the work of the CHR that facilitated the weakening of the CHR and its mechanisms. It led to the near-emasculation of the Sub Commission, restrictions on NGOs, among other things. In view of the attacks on the special mechanisms - who you admirably defended - during the previous  session of the Commission, don't you think any attempt at "rationalisation" runs the risk of playing into the hands of the critics of the special mechanisms"?

BR: We at OHCHR have focused on a strengthened support and methods of work. We have not followed the line of rationalisation.

HRF: Drawing from your experiences and the ideas you have set forth in the past, about having the SG and/or special rapporteurs brief the Security Council fortnightly about situations of concern, do you plan to push that agenda forward during your stint as Acting High Commissioner?

BR: Yes, very much so. You will see this in my Annual Report to the Commission.

HRF: The former High Commissioner, the late Mr. Sergio de Mello, suggested at the end of last year's session that the CHR might decide to bring the special procedures and national institutions into the agenda earlier in order to give them the attention and importance they deserve. Is it something your office intends to follow up on? Did it come up during the drawing up of this year's agenda?

BR: This is an idea I had advanced and I will certainly continue to advocate it.

HRF: With regard to the ongoing debate on criteria - or rather, 'minimum standards', as Mr. de Mello termed it - for membership of the Commission, have you received any indications as to how States feel about it? Do you see it as a workable proposition?

BR: States are reticent. In my Annual Report, I have advanced other ideas.

HRF: High Commissioner, during the last session of the Commission, non-governmental organisations observed a conscious attempt by some states to curtail their ability to fully contribute to the work of the CHR. We understand that at least two regional groupings seek to renew their effort in the Bureau to further this NGO unfriendly agenda. Of some concern is that these very states have been instrumental in bringing a large number of Government Organised NGOs, whose sole objective is to muddy the waters relating to NGO contribution to the work of the CHR. What will be the role, if any, of your Office to ensure that NGO participation is not curtailed but enhanced?

BR: We have been ardently advocating the case for optimum participation by NGOs, including adequate speaking time.

HRF: Last year, we saw a plethora of no action resolutions by some states. Coupled with this is a clear attempt to discourage any discussion on country-specific mandates. How do you plan to address this challenge to accountability?

BR: This is a matter for States. As a matter of principle, we must insist on the concept of accountability.

HRF: Finally, what do you see as your most important contribution to the work of the OHCHR over the past few years?

BR: Keeping the Office focused on its mission; professionalising it; strengthening the Office internally; and developing a policy architecture for human rights protection on the ground.

HRF: You have been the High Commissioner for a year now. What has it been like?

BR: A job of passion, in very difficult times.

HRF: What do you consider to be your most important achievement?

BR: Keeping the Office focused, professional and in first-class shape during this difficult period.

HRF: You have submitted key reports to the Security Council, ECOSOC, the General Assembly and the Commission. What have you sought to achieve through these reports?

BR: To sharpen the focus on human rights.

HRF: You have reacted to a number of situations of gross violations of human rights through public statements. What has it been like?

BR: I have issued some 40 public statements expressing concern over the past year. I have never shirked from reacting to a situation.

HRF: Have you also acted behind the scenes?

BR: Yes. In numerous instances, I have sought to use human rights diplomacy for the protection of those at risk. I have on occasion received warm notes from those on whose behalf I acted.

HRF: You have also made quite a few policy statements…

BR: Yes. I believe I made some 70 such statements in which I sought to spell out a human rights policy for the future.

HRF: What are your key messages for the forthcoming Commission?

BR: In the annual report I have submitted to the Commission, I have sought to urge them to modernise themselves, to strengthen protection, to protect the victims of trafficking and to draft a Convention on human rights education.

HRF: Why a Convention on human rights education?

BR: Because we must sharpen the definition of policy when it comes to formulating courses and materials on human rights in local languages. Human rights education is the key to the future. So is support for the role of judges in the protection of human rights. This is so very important.

HRF: A final comment?

BR: It has been, for me, "To Serve With Passion".


CTC: Counter human rights committee?

The Counter Terrorism Committee may be undermining States’ duty to protect basic liberties

"[B]uilding a durable global human rights culture, by asserting the value and worth of every human being, is essential if terrorism is to be eliminated." - Mary Robinson 

The critical issue of protecting human rights whilst countering terrorism is at the forefront of this year’s meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights. There is currently no international institution with a mandate to assess whether measures taken and justified by a State as necessary to combat terrorism are in violation of its international human rights obligations. Following endless recommendations, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), established by the Security Council, has finally indicated recognition of the value of incorporating a human rights expert as part its mandate.

State counter-terrorist measures since 11 September 2001 show a global pattern of systematic erosion of civil liberties. The arbitrary detention of 600 detainees in Guantanamo Bay, the categorisation of Uighur minorities in China as "terrorists" and their subsequent executions, the indefinite detention of non-nationals without charge or trial in the UK, the provision for immunity from prosecution for officials in India and Russia on the basis of acting in good faith, the increased use of military tribunals in Egypt to try civilians, the use of punitive policies against refugees and asylum seekers, the refoulement of alleged terrorists to jurisdictions where they are certain to be tortured, and the re-introduction of capital punishment for terrorist offences in the USA, China, Jordan, India and others, offer a select testimony to the fact that the disappearance of legal safeguards in the political post-September 11 climate is not a theoretical concern.

Nor is it a theoretical concern that the UN to this point has been bureaucratically incapable of, or its constituent members even intentionally unwilling to, establish an adequate means to respond to the growing crisis. Early fears that Security Council resolution 1373's "get going on effective measures now" message could be exploited to circumvent States' human rights obligations were well founded. Despite the adoption of Security Council resolution 1456 (2003), requiring that counter terrorism measures must be "in accordance with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law", haphazard legislation had already been implemented and routinely employed in many States. The lack of an international monitoring body has only served to facilitate the continued abuse of resolution 1373. 

Resolution 1373 establishing a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the Council to "raise the average level of government performance against terrorism across the globe" by "upgrading the capacity of each nation's legislation and executive machinery to fight terrorism", left the body to its own discretion regarding its mandate. Former High Commissioners for Human Rights Mary Robinson and the late Sergio De Mello expected, at the very least, that the CTC's work would be directed by the principles of legality, non-derogability, necessity and proportionality, non-discrimination, due process and rule of law, and right to seek asylum/non-refoulement.

However, the CTC stressed from the outset that "monitoring performance against other international conventions, including human rights law, is outside the scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee's mandate". In the past, the CTC has been happy to liaison with human rights experts on an ad hoc basis, and just as happy to continue to ignore all their recommendations in practice. 

Rather than assess human rights in any capacity, the CTC has in fact been accused on occasion of undermining States’ protection of human rights safeguards. Citing the example of Kenya, whose government reportedly came under pressure to enact legislation modelled on the USA Patriot Act, Global Advocacy Director of Human Rights Watch Rory Mungoven has accused the CTC of being complicit by its silence of supporting legislation that violates fundamental principles of international law.

Human Rights Committee expert Sir Nigel Rodley, speaking directly to the CTC, went one step further by noting that the CTC's questions to the State report of Slovakia "could be understood to be urging the State to overlook the principles that in no case should a person be sent to a territory where he or she faces torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or a violations of the right to life." 

This is the Committee that the UN has entrusted to monitor counter-terrorism measures "in accordance with the purposes and principles of the U.N Charter."

The CTC expects to leave monitoring to the already under-funded UN treaty and charter based human rights bodies. The Human Rights Committee has acted commendably within the confines of its mandate by reviewing ex officio State party reports to the CTC, and expressing concerns in Egypt, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK relating to administrative detention without effective judicial review; expulsion of those at risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; retroactive law making; and restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly. The Committee Against Torture (CAT) and the Committee On the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) have done likewise in their respective capacities. 

However, these bodies are not capable of examining the complexity of issues on a sustained basis, collectively or otherwise. Treaty monitoring bodies can only cover issues relative to their respective treaties, and the reports of States party to them. This automatically excludes over one quarter of UN member States in the case of CAT. State party reports are submitted on a periodic basis, and many are seriously overdue. Furthermore, the Committees are only capable of considering on average fifteen reports per year. Adding all the other human rights issues they must address, this hardly amounts to an immediate and comprehensive response to counter-terrorism measures.     

Likewise, all charter-based mechanisms are severely limited in their capabilities. The Commission presently suffers from a politicisation that is at odds with the type of global response required. Special Rapporteurs suffer from what has been referred to as the "circumscribed and particularised nature of each mandate", where certain aspects of counter-terrorist activity fall under the mandates of several different Special Rapporteurs, whilst others are not covered at all. Moreover, the "more humanitarian than judicial" nature of certain urgent action procedures and the ineffective means of following up on recommendations means that the input of Special Rapporteurs may appear peripheral.

The Sub-Committee on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights has taken positive steps in the past, appointing a Special Rapporteur on the question of terrorism and human rights in 1998. However, Ms. Kallipoli Koufa's mandate is directed towards a more conceptual analysis of the areas in which terrorism, rather than counter-terrorism, affects the full enjoyment of human rights. In August 2003 the Sub-Commission tabled the creation of a working group to examine counter-terrorism measures. A welcome addition, this is however only at the draft resolution stage, and will not come before the Sub-Commission until August 2004.

Considerably more is required. Firstly, a Special Rapporteur must be appointed at the Commission level to monitor and investigate the compatibility of counter-terrorism measures through in situ country visits and correspondence. Its mandate must cover the use of emergency laws; vague definitions of "terrorism" designed to suppress freedom of expression, association, assembly, religion, and movement; the use of unlawful force; torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; unlawful detention; due process and fair trial; methods of search and seizure; protection from refoulement; discrimination; and the right to effective remedy. The Rapporteur's goals should be to identify and highlight areas of concern, request explanations to State practices, and identify methods of best practice.

The relationship between the CTC and the OHCHR needs to be formalised and strengthened. To date, the OHCHR talks and the CTC pretends to listen, but carries on regardless. In view of the global pattern of counter terrorist measures, increased co-operation with regional and national bodies also needs to be strengthened. At the recent Asia Pacific Forum for National Human Rights Institutions, it was suggested by the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network that member national institutions should be requested to submit their findings on counter-terrorism measures to the OHCHR, which in turn would forward these reports, with additional recommendations, to the CTC. This initiative was welcomed by the representative of the OHCHR, and would be an invaluable resource to any human rights expert appointed to the CTC.

But it is to the higher echelons of the United Nations that the issue must also be taken. A recent open briefing of the Security Council on 4 March 2004, discussing the "urgent and absolutely necessary” need to revamp the CTC, addressed the need to establish a new 'counter-terrorism directorate' which would expand the CTC's team of technical experts. Following suggestions presented in a letter to the Council by CTC Chairman Inocencio Arias on 19 February, a core bloc of Latin American and European countries supported the immediate need for the appointment of a human rights expert.

According to Richard Ryan, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN, speaking on behalf of the European Union, there "could be no trade off between human rights and effective counter-terrorism measures" and this required not only the appointment of a human rights expert but also a provision for direct liaising between the proposed Directorate and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Regrettably, permanent Council members the US, UK, France, China and Russia all remained silent on the subject of human rights. This debate will be resumed after the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights.

These constitute the minimum immediate requirements for an effective assessment of State compliance. The "urgency and indispensability" of these requirements cannot be understated, as, to quote Kofi Annan on his address to the Security Council in January 2003: "[W]e must never lose sight of the fact that any sacrifice of freedom or the rule of law within States … is to hand the terrorists a victory that no act of theirs alone could possibly bring."


Treaty compliance: Big democracy fails test

The first of a two-part series looks at India’s compliance with the ICCPR, ICESCR and ICERD

INDIA

Treaty Compliance-I

On paper, the Indian Government's commitment to the human rights standards enunciated in several key international instruments is exemplary. It has acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), indicating its willingness to be bound by the treaties in international law.

 

However, the reality of India's human rights record reveals that this formal affirmation of human rights is deceptive. The same fundamental rights that the State has pledged to protect in the three aforementioned treaties continue to be routinely violated through the application of particular laws and the actions of State authorities. This disparity between the rhetoric and practice of the Indian Government is disturbing. It calls into question whether the Government's ratification of the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the ICERD is motivated by a genuine commitment to human rights, or the need to divert international scrutiny from the plight of its citizens.

The Caste System

Caste-based discrimination remains endemic in Indian society. The groups occupying the lowest echelons of the caste system, particularly the Dalits or the Scheduled Castes, are regularly denied basic political, economic, social and cultural rights. The range of abuses to which they are subjected include torture, restrictions on their freedom of movement, and forced participation in such degrading tasks as manual scavenging.

In spite of the fact that this constitutes a clear derogation from the provisions of the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the ICERD, the Indian Government has sought to frame caste-based discrimination as a social issue of purely domestic concern, rather than a human rights problem warranting international attention. This argument ignores indications that comparable kinds of discrimination exist in numerous countries in Asia and Africa. Even so, the Indian Government was successful in ensuring caste-based discrimination was omitted from the agenda of the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and All Related Forms of Intolerance, held in late 2001.

However, this reasoning has been unequivocally rejected by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the monitoring body established under the Convention. The Committee has recognised caste-based discrimination as a form of discrimination based on descent and has passed a general recommendation reiterating this view, putting the question of the scope of the ICERD beyond doubt.

The Rights of Indigenous Peoples

The rights of indigenous peoples are enshrined in various provisions of the ICERD, the ICCPR and the ICESCR. In particular, the right of all peoples to self-determination is recognised in Articles 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Contrary to these provisions, the Indian Government has acted to suppress movements for self-determination and has adopted a policy of preserving national integrity at all costs. Although the Indian Government ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR with reservations in respect of those Articles, this does not diminish the seriousness of the abuses systematically inflicted upon its indigenous populations.

The tribal people of Northeast India, for example, have suffered economic deprivation, social and cultural oppression and have been the victims of a discriminatory application of emergency laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. Section 4(a) of the AFSPA provides that any commissioned officer or a person of equivalent rank in the Armed Forces is empowered to shoot to kill after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary.

The 4th International Conference of the International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests held in Nairobi in 2002 took note of the Indian Government's policies that stifle the aspirations of the indigenous people of the Northeast through laws legitimising the brutalisation of the people in the region. The Conference was also vocal in its criticism of the 'development projects' instigated by the Indian Government, which result in the large-scale displacement of thousands of tribals from their ancestral land.

The Rights of Religious Minorities

Instances of the complicity of State agents in the persecution of religious minorities in India continue to undermine the Government's purported commitment to the protections contained in the ICERD. In the aftermath of the Gujarat riots in early 2002, overwhelming evidence emerged implicating members of the police force in the violence against Muslims. Furthermore, collusion between police and Government officials to protect the perpetrators of the violence from prosecution was reportedly widespread.

Far from being an aberration in the behaviour of State officials, the tendency of law enforcement agencies to side with the Hindu majority in communal riots has been publicly acknowledged for some time. Indeed, the 1981 Report of the National Police Commission admitted to such a bias in the operations of its police officers.

The uncertain predicament of religious minorities in India is also apparent in the passage of anti-conversion laws in the early 1990s. Although ostensibly secular in purpose, the laws in fact operate to reinforce the dominance of the Hindu majority.

The Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance shared this conclusion, reporting in 1992 on the forced conversions of Christians to Hinduism in the state of Madhya Pradesh, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party which governed the State at the time. The same trend is apparent in more recent legislation enacted by the state government in Tamil Nadu and the Government of the state of Gujarat.

Reporting Obligations

In light of the range of human rights violations in India that contravene provisions of the ICERD, it is unsurprising that the Indian Government has been reluctant to submit its compliance reports to the CERD. It submitted its 16th and 17th reports after receiving four and three reminders from the Committee respectively.

The Death Penalty

In spite of its obligation under Article 6(6) of the ICCPR to work towards the abolition of the death penalty, the Indian Government has signalled its movement in the opposite direction by broadening the applicability of the death penalty as a punishment for 'terrorist acts' in its recent counter-terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2001.

Furthermore, the Government is yet to amend the Indian Penal Code to ensure that persons are not executed for crimes committed when they were under the age of eighteen, in line with the requirements of Article 6(5) of the ICCPR. In conjunction with its reticence on the issue of signing the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, this suggests a lack of good faith on the part of the Indian Government in its efforts to comply with the provisions of the ICCPR.

Rights in a State of Emergency

Although Article 4 of the ICCPR allows for the suspension of some of the rights contained in the Covenant in times of 'public emergency', it does not allow derogation from designated fundamental human rights under any circumstances.

Several pieces of legislation enacted by the Indian Government clearly fall foul of this provision, including the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the National Security Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. None of these Acts were enacted in an officially proclaimed emergency. Of greater concern, however, is their authorisation of measures such as arbitrary detention and other infringements upon fundamental human rights standards expressly prohibited by the ICCPR.

The Government has invoked the threat to India's security posed by terrorist organisations to justify the passage of such draconian legislation. However, it is clear that anti-terrorist legislation that does not conform with human rights standards only serves to perpetuate the violation of human rights rather than redress the violations of human rights committed by terrorist acts.

Official Immunity

Both the ICCPR (in Article 2(3)) and the ICERD (in Article 6) enunciate the need for an effective remedy to be available to victims of human rights abuses. However, section 6 of India's Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act grants members of the armed forces immunity from prosecution. Given the regular allegations of human rights violations committed by India's Border Security Forces in the past, this amounts to a denial of justice and redress in the form of compensation to significant numbers of people.

Monitoring and Complaints Procedures under the ICCPR

The ICCPR provides for two complaints procedures - one available to individuals under the First Optional Protocol, and one available to States under Article 41 of the Covenant. However, the Indian Government has failed to consent to either of these mechanisms, depriving its citizens of an important alternative avenue of redress against the State.

States that have acceded to the ICCPR are also expected to submit periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee detailing its compliance with the Covenants requirements. Each of the reports India has submitted thus far have been late, and the Committee is currently awaiting India's fourth report which was due in 2001.

The Indian Government's reports have often been criticised for focusing on describing the legal safeguards in place to protect human rights, rather than the practical effectiveness of their implementation.

The Right to Food

Article 11 of the ICESCR enshrines the right to food as a basic human right. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights elaborated on this issue by noting in its 29th Session that 'the roots of the problem of hunger…are not lack of food but lack of access to available food…'

This is the context in which the right to food in India must be viewed. The Government often emphasises the country's transition from an agrarian deficiency to an agrarian surplus. However, this does not address the problem of the lack of a basic food supply to close to 400 million people, while the surplus rots in Government godowns. In a positive development however, the Supreme Court of India has passed orders asking the authorities in numerous states to ensure that families below the poverty line are provided with adequate food. The court has also undertaken to monitor the implementation of the orders. However, it is alarming that the right to food is only receiving recognition on account of an activist judiciary. It is clearly still imperative that the Government intervene to address this crisis.

The Right to Housing and Health

Article 11(1) of the ICESCR recognises a right to housing as part of the right to an adequate standard of living. There is also an emerging global consensus towards a stronger recognition of an individual's housing rights.

Contrary to this, the Indian Government - far from recognising any concrete right to housing - is busy rendering more and more people homeless. For example, in NBA v. Union of India, despite being briefed about the lack of adequate resettlement for the people that would be displaced, the court authorised the Sardar Sarovar Project observing that '...displacement of the tribals and other persons would not per se result in the violation of their fundamental or other rights…'. Furthermore, in a recent order the Supreme Court permitted further raising of the dam that would displace more people with no prospect for rehabilitation, again despite the opinion forwarded by the Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing to the contrary.

Measures to promote better health are also being increasingly viewed as part of the duty of the Government arising out of the corresponding human right to health reflected in Article 12 of the ICESCR. General Comment 14 of the Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that the right to health requires availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality with regard to both health care and the underlying preconditions of health. The main problem in India is the existence of a privatised and unregulated health care system. The profit motive inherent in the operation of a private health system means that healthcare is unaffordable for most poor citizens. The result is a massive disparity in healthcare available for the poor as opposed to the rich.

Conclusion

A cursory glance at India's human rights record exposes the Government's failure to translate its rhetoric in international fora into concrete domestic safeguards for human rights. India's most vulnerable citizens, principally the poor, and ethnic and religious minorities, continue to suffer from human rights violations that impinge upon the whole spectrum of their rights - political, economic, social and cultural. The Indian Government must dedicate on-going time and resources to the implementation of its human rights obligations. Otherwise, its ratification of international treaties will continue to be regarded as little more than a disingenuous exercise in international diplomacy.


Zimbabwe: It’s not about West vs Rest

With the Asian bloc helpfully pitching in, African countries thwarted the resolution against Zimbabwe last year. The EU will need to work the corridors strenuously if it wants a resolution passed this year... 

Zimbabwe is at crisis point. With unemployment rising, incomes and foreign investment falling and an inflation rate of over 500 percent, the country is facing a severe food shortage which has left over 5.5 million people in need of food aid. The country's previously healthy agricultural industry, which once served as a food exporter to its poorer neighbors, has been destroyed, in part due to drought but mainly by President Mugabe's controversial land reforms.

Yet, not only must Zimbabweans contend with a food emergency and a deteriorating economy, they are also faced with a deteriorating human rights situation, as President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) continue to suppress all forms of opposition to his regime.

According to the US Department of State report on human rights practices in Zimbabwe in 2003, there has been a systematic government-sanctioned, campaign of violence targeting supporters and potential supporters of the government's main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The MDC faces significant intimidation, and during 2003, the police arrested 17 out of the 53 of the MDC's Members of Parliament, some on more than one occasion. MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai was arrested twice in June and faces charges that include treason for allegedly plotting the assassination of President Mugabe.

The Official Secrets Act and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which grant a wide range of powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined, have been gratuitously applied to suppress freedom of expression and movement and to silence all forms of political opposition. Human Rights Watch reports that the work of NGOs is also being progressively more controlled and suppressed through the use of POSA.

The police repeatedly used force to break up nonviolent demonstrations and to prevent public gatherings from taking place. In October, the Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Ambeyi Ligabo; the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Commission's Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Leila Zerroügui, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights defenders, Hina Jilani, expressed concern regarding the arrest of more than forty trade unionists during a national protest demonstration.

In November, the Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement expressing his concern regarding reports that more than 100 trade unionists and civil leaders had been arrested on 18 November 2003 during a protest demonstration in the capital Harare. The Government has also repressed the work of journalists and media organisations through the use of restrictive legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA).

In September, the privately-owned Daily News was closed for failing to fulfill registration requirements under the AIPPA. The police have ignored subsequent Court rulings authorising the Daily News to re-open and ordering the police to vacate the premises.

The Government controls all domestic radio broadcasting, and most newspapers practice self-censorship due to government intimidation and fear of prosecution for libel. Foreign journalists were frequently denied visas to enter the country, and in May the Government deported an American journalist after he wrote about the political situation in the country.

The Government has made numerous attempts to subvert the independence of the judiciary, applying intense political pressure on judges and repeatedly refusing to abide by judicial decisions. On 24 September 2002 and 19 February 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers expressed grave concern over the criminal charges brought against two Zimbabwean judges and their implications on judicial independence and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

The Government's famine relief operation, managed by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), has been accused of diverting food aid to supporters of the ZANU-PF. According to Human Rights Watch, those responsible for drawing up the lists of the needy are under instructions to exclude all MDC supporters and residents of former commercial farms resettled under the country's "fast-track" land reform program.

The National Youth Service program, initiated by the Government in 2001 to promote patriotism, has been used to create youth militias trained to kill and torture. The government youth militias have been accused of torturing, beating and raping opponents of the government. There have also been allegations of the systematic rape of young girls at national youth service training camps, reportedly as "part of the training". Students entering college, teacher training schools or the civil service must have undergone training in the youth program.

Mugabe's Ploy: Blame Neocolonialism

When faced with criticism regarding his Government's human rights abuses, Mugabe claims to be a victim of an Anglo-Saxon conspiracy to prevent him from divesting white farmers of their vast holdings. Mugabe blames the country's collapsing economy and escalating law and order problem on a sinister alliance of Britain, white farmers and assorted 'traitors' who are conspiring to reverse the country's independence.

Mugabe's strategy of turning the issue into a black vs white dispute was again exemplified in December 2003. Following the decision to renew Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth due to the rigged presidential elections in 2002, Mugabe terminated Zimbabwe's membership of the Commonwealth and described the Commonwealth's decision, promoted by Britain and Australia, as "pure racism".

Whilst it is clear that Mugabe's controversial land reforms policy has been a factor in the escalating human rights crisis in Zimbabwe, Western countries have been wary of focusing on the issue in the CHR, lest they play into the hands of Mugabe. Both of the European Union's previous draft resolutions on Zimbabwe have failed to recommend any concrete measures to address the issue of land reform. However, the CHR should not be swayed by political arguments on Zimbabwe and should condemn the growing incidence of human rights violations in the country.

Debacle of the 58th and 59th CHR Sessions

The European Union failed in its previous attempts to bring a resolution against Zimbabwe at the CHR in 2002 and 2003. On both occasions, President Mugabe succeeded in his ploy of convincing members of both the African and Asian Groups that the main purpose of the draft resolutions was not to protect human rights, but instead was a politically motivated attempt at neocolonialism.

In 2003, the representative of South Africa, speaking on behalf of the African Group, criticised the European Union's stance as being "politically motivated", claiming that the text of the draft resolution "lacked the requisite balance between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. Closer inspection revealed that the draft resolution's sponsors did not fully understand Zimbabwe's history, or were choosing to ignore it for reasons of political expediency."

On both occasions the resolutions were scuttled by procedural no-action motions as the Group of African States, together with members of the Asian Group, voted to obstruct the resolution, and prevented the Commission from debating the subject matter of the resolutions.

A glimmer of hope for the 60th session?

The economic sanctions imposed upon Zimbabwe by the European Union were renewed and extended earlier this year, and the European Parliament has again called upon the European Union to sponsor a resolution on Zimbabwe. What remains to be seen is whether Mugabe will again succeed in burying the pressing issue of human rights violations in Zimbabwe under a mountain of political rhetoric.

In this era of the "war against terrorism", when the political will to fight human rights violations is diminishing in western countries, it is vital that the European Union take an active and vigorous role in gathering support for a resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe. The member countries of the European Union would do well to recall the active campaigning of Zimbabwe and other African countries prior to the no-action motion last year.

Prior to any decision to vote as a bloc to obstruct a resolution on Zimbabwe, African Nations should look beyond the politics of land reform and let Zimbabwe's human rights record speak for itself.

Zimbabwe's neighbours must remember that protecting the rights of the citizens of Zimbabwe is essential not only for the stability and security in Zimbabwe, but for the region as well.

Reign of Terror

MORE than 18,000 students have graduated from the National Youth Service Program in Zimbabwe since its inception in 2001. The programme, purportedly a voluntary training program for instilling a feeling of nationalism in the Zimbabwean youth in the age group of 10-30 years, has become a compulsory paramilitary training ground. The Mugabe government has consistently denied allegations of forcing the youth to compulsorily join these youth service camps.

The youth militia, also known as the "green bombers" have been accused of several human rights violations including murder, rape and torture. They have been openly used by the Mugabe government as a tool to terrorise the Zimbabwean people, especially the opposition activists.

Apart from committing atrocities on their fellow peoples, the youth militia have themselves been subjected to various human rights abuses at the training camps. The camps impart military training to children as young as eleven years of age, thereby creating child soldiers.

The female youth militia have reported systematic rape and sexual abuse in these training camps as a part of the training process.


Derogating from justice

Faustian British bargain attempts to trade fundamental liberties for national security

Decades after seeing preventative detention fail in Northern Ireland, the British Government is at it again. In the name of national security, the United Kingdom's anti-terrorism legislation grants extraordinary executive powers of indefinite detention that contradict both international human rights law and the core values of Britain's own legal heritage.

The British Parliament debated and enacted the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act ("ATCSA") in the months following the September 11 attacks. The Act contains a panoply of provisions in the name of combating terrorism. This article focuses on Part IV of the Act, which returns preventive detention to the British statute books. Part IV allows the Home Secretary (Mr David Blunkett MP) to order the indefinite detention of any foreign national whom he believes to be a terrorist and a risk to national security. Specifically, the Part is intended to allow the indefinite detention of any foreign national who, for either practical or legal reasons, cannot be deported to any foreign country (for example, because that person may have a well-founded fear of persecution upon return).

This power does not exist in name alone. The British Government arrested and detained the first eight suspected terrorists within days of the legislation's enactment.  At the time of writing, the Home Secretary has detained 16 foreign nationals under the Act, of whom 14 remain in detention and two have left the country (for France and Morocco). One further foreign national has been certified for detention, but is currently detained under other legal powers.  In detaining these men - without trial and with limited right of review - the British Government has abandoned long-standing obligations under international, European and British law.

The Right to Liberty

In Woolmington's Case of 1935, the British Lord Chancellor Lord Sankey famously wrote: "Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law, one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt..."

This principle - the presumption of innocence - has underpinned the rights of citizens and foreign nationals alike in Britain for hundreds of years. It has long been understood that to make extended criminal detention conditional on the state proving its case in open court is to ensure a vital check on a power that can be misused by even the best intentioned government.

The Home Secretary has argued, "if we know there is a threat...we need to be able to ensure that we can continue to protect ourselves from the conspiracy to act." This argument is utterly disingenuous - for conspiracy to commit an unlawful act is itself a recognised offence before British law. What the Secretary defends is not the ability to act against known conspirators (for the Crown has that power already) but rather the power to detain people indefinitely upon a mere suspicion - without confidently knowing whether they pose a threat at all. The Secretary argues that "[i]n such circumstances, the evidential thresholds for action have to be acceptable in a democracy..."  - but this is precisely the point. Judicial independence - including unwavering commitment to the presumption of innocence - lies at the very foundation of the liberal democratic ideal. The only "evidential thresholds for action" that are truly "acceptable in a democracy" are those that require the state