India’s arms sales to Israel: Bad legally, worse ethically—Part 4

India–Israel arms relations: Deep and dangerous for Indian democracy

Ravi Nair·October 8, 2024

The final part of the four-part deep-dive into the recent case before the Supreme Court of India calling for a halt to arms sale to Israel as it commits genocide against the Palestinians.

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Read Part 1 here.

Read Part 2 here.

Read Part 3 here.

IN the history of Indian bilateral defence cooperation with other countries since Independence, our armed forces had and continue to have good relations with some dodgy undemocratic partners.

The most egregious of them in the past was Saddam’s Iraq, which just gassed the inhabitants of Halabja and inflicted regular pogroms on the Marsh Arabs and the Kurds.

Nearer home, to name just one, is the so-called pragmatic relationship with the Tatmadaw, the Myanmar military junta, that leaves a trail of death, rapine and pillage across the non-Burman ethnic areas.

However, the depth and intensity of the relationship with Netanyahu’s Israel bodes ill for the tottering pillars of Indian democracy already being shaken by Hindutva— akin to Zionism— and not only for the exclusionary worldview.

Starting with Narasimha Rao, a former prime minister who got us on the road to the muscular Hindutva security State, we have come a long way.

Israel telling the secretary general of the UN that he is not welcome in the country and yet be considered democratic by many Western capitals and multilateral organisations is stretching incredulity far beyond breaking point.

The Indian security State has cosied up with such worthies as Myanmar and Israel since 1992. An Israel that bombs Gaza in a manner that makes the London Blitz, and the fire-bombing of Dresden and Tokyo during the Second World War passé.

An Israel that thinks that the resolutions of the United Nations on the Occupation are to be scoffed at, even the minimalist Oslo Accords to be violated with impunity, the International Court of Justice to be dismissed and the secretary general of the United Nations be told that he is not welcome in Israel and yet be considered as democratic by many Western capitals and multilateral organisations is stretching incredulity far beyond breaking point.

A ready reckoner of the India-Israel defence relationship

It is useful to do a quick ready reckoner of the depth of India’s defence relationship with Israel. Were Israel a democratic country, it would be kosher. Anyone claiming today’s Israel is democratic is a fit candidate for Bedlam.

Also read: In the Gaza genocide, UN has suffered an irreparable loss of reputation

India is the world’s largest weapons importer by value, accounting for 10 percent of global arms imports from 2008 to 2023. New Delhi is expected to spend at least US $200 billion in the coming decade to modernise its armed forces.

India’s current defence arsenal is heavily stocked with Russian-supplied equipment. Since 2008, about 62 percent of India’s defence imports (by value) have come from Russia; other top suppliers include France (11 percent), the United States (10 percent) and Israel (7 percent).

India’s imports from Israel

India imported military hardware worth US $2.9 billion from Israel over the last decade, including radars, surveillance and combat drones, and missiles.

Israel’s Elbit Systems partners with Indian conglomerate Adani group to manufacture some of its Hermes900 drones at a facility in southern India, which are exported back to Israel for its use.

The remnants of an Indian drone or projectile were found in Gaza. What is of even more concern is that these armaments are being used in what India, at least on paper, considers Occupied Territories.

In September 2024, India for the first time abstained from voting for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling on Israel to vacate the Occupied Territories.

While importing huge amounts of armaments from Israel, we have also exported a fraction of the quantum of the imports (see chart below):

The Indian ministry of defence’s annual reports are indicative of the depth of the relations with Israel in the area of defence cooperation.

2000–04

Yedidia Ya’ari, the then commander of the Israeli Navy (2000–04) visited India in December 2002. Israel, among other countries, set up its national pavilion in the International Land and Naval Systems Exhibition in Defexpo India in 2002.

India is the world’s largest weapons importer by value, accounting for 10 percent of global arms imports from 2008 to 2023.

More importantly, the first meeting of the Joint India–Israel Working Group on Defence Cooperation, held in Israel in September 2002, solidified defence relations between the two countries.

Also read: The UNHRC concluding observations do not allow for semantics

In the Annual Report for 2003–04, Indo–Israeli staff talks took place in New Delhi from December 15–18, 2003. A memorandum of principles and order of cooperation on Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) was signed by the governments of India, Israel and the Russian Federation on October 10, 2003.

An Inter-Government Agreement (IGA) was concluded with Israel on March 3, 2004, followed by a contract with M/s IAD Elta System to acquire AWACS aircraft.

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited achieved exports of ₹215.21 crore for the financial year 2003–04. A memorandum of understanding was signed with IAI, Israel for joint marketing of advanced light helicopter (ALH) fitted with state-of-the-art Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) avionics for the international market.

As part of India strengthening its defence relations internationally— the India–Israel Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation was set up in December 2003. There were visits by Israeli service chiefs and chiefs of the army in November 2003, and chiefs of the air force in February–March 2004.

Navy to navy meetings to discuss joint exercises and activities, or meetings of an operational nature were also held with Israel. The second meeting of the India-Israel Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation was held in India in December 2003.

Israel was well represented at the DEFEXPO 2004 defence industry exhibition with a delegation headed by Israeli Deputy Defence Minister, Ze’er Boim.

From India, the chief of air staff visited Israel in September 2004. In December 2004, the third meeting of the India–Israel Joint Working Group on Defence was held in Tel Aviv. It was headed by the director general of the Israeli ministry of defence.

Four ships of the Western Fleet, namely, Mysore, Godavari, Ganga and Shakti, were deployed to the Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean Sea on overseas deployment. During the deployment, the ships visited ports in Israel.

Also read: ‘Flag of freedom’ should fly ‘not only for ourselves’: Gaza and India’s constitutional responsibility

Demonstration firing of artillery ammunition was conducted successfully at Pokhran in June 2004. The ammunition has been manufactured under a memorandum of understanding with Israel Military Industries, Israel, at the Ordnance Factory Chandrapur (OFCH), Ordnance Factory Ambajhari (OFAJ) and Ordnance Factory Kanpur (OFC).

There was also a bilateral institution building, with meetings at Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (Israel).

Joint development projects between the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Israel and the Indian navy to develop a highly sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missile system is in progress.

2007–08

The AWACS were procured from Israel to meet the long-felt need of the Indian Air Force (IAF). It was a joint development programme of DRDO, the Indian navy and IAI, Israel. The AWACS have a range of 70 km using a dual-pulse rocket motor and active radar seeker in the terminal phase and inertial and mid-course update for guidance. A strategic test of a two-proof motor has been completed successfully.

DRDO has agreements with many countries for collaboration in the field of defence technologies, including Israel. The Indo-Israel managing committee is being organised regularly.

In September 2024, India for the first time abstained from voting for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling on Israel to vacate the Occupied Territories. 

Defence relations with Israel continued to be cordial and mutually beneficial. Yecheil Horev, director of security of defence establishment and senior deputy director general, Israel, visited India in June 2007. Major General (Retired) Yosi Ben Hanan, director SIBAT during July 23–25, 2007 and chief of staff of Israel navy vice admiral David Ben Bashat during August 26–29, 2007 visited India.

An Israeli delegation led by B.G. Pinchas Buchris, director general, ministry of defence, Israel visited India from December 30, 2007 to January 1, 2008 to participate in the sixth meeting of the India–Israel Joint Working Group (JWG).

The fifth round of navy to navy staff talks were held in Tel Aviv in October 2007. Second air force staff talks were held in New Delhi on January 15–16, 2007. Third round of army to army staff talks were conducted in India from November 26–29, 2007.

2008–09

The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) successfully demonstrated the indigenous 130 mm cargo ammunition produced by them in technical collaboration with IMI, Israel. Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) exported the Infrared Radiation Interference Indicators (IRII) worth US $1,57,000 to Electro-Optics Industries (ELOP), Israel during the year 2007–08.

Also read: India arms exports: A protection of civilians lens is required

Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (LR-SAM), a joint development programme of DRDO, Indian Navy and IAI, Israel, took off. There was also joint development between India and Israel of a dual-colour missile approach warning system. Another joint development programme was the Trajectory Correction System (TCS) for Pinaka (Phase I) between DRDO and IMI, Israel.

Amir Kain, head of director of the security of defence establishment (DSDE) (MALMAB) led a delegation to India during July 21–23, 2008. Major general (retired) Ehud Shani, head of defence export and cooperation department (SIBAT), Israel visited India and held meetings with senior officers on December 8, 2008. India’s secretary (defence production) led a delegation to Israel in September 2008.

India and Israel set up a Sub Group on Defence Procurement, Production and Development to promote cooperation. This sub-group is co-chaired on the Indian side by the director general (acquisition).

The second meeting of this sub-group was held in New Delhi on February 13–14, 2008, while its third meeting was held in Tel Aviv on September 21–23, 2008.

Indian defence secretary led a delegation to Israel to attend the seventh meeting of the India–Israel Joint Working Group on November 12, 2008.

2009–10

The Indian army and navy signed an annual joint maintenance contract for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of five years with IAI, Israel. The Indian navy undertook passage exercises with Israel.

The chief of army staff (COAS) of India visited Israel on November 8–10, 2009. The fourth air force to air force staff talks were held on November 17, 2009. The fourth India–Israel Sub Working Group met on December 21, 2009. The eighth India–Israel Joint Working Group meeting was held on December 22, 2009.

2010–11

The IAF contracted 15 Low-Level Light Weight Radar (LLLWR) from Israel. The first ballistic control flight test was successfully conducted in Israel. Vice admiral Eliezer Marom, commander-in-chief of the Israeli navy, visited India on January 18–21, 2010.

Also read: Will the tiny sparks of student protests in India rekindle the flame of India’s historical support for Palestine?

Major general (retired) Edud Shani, director general of the Israeli ministry of defence, visited India again from February 15-18, 2010. S.K. Sharma, director general (acquisition), visited Israel to co-chair the fifth India–Israel Sub Working Group on May 2, 2010. On November 1-3, 2010, the fifth air force to air force staff talks were held in Tel Aviv.

As part of India strengthening its defence relations internationally— the India–Israel Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation was set up in December 2003.

The Indian ministry of defence procured an aerial reconnaissance system costing ₹641 crore from M/s IAI Elta, Israel without fully evaluating the system as per the defence procurement procedure. Despite spending ₹611 crore and the delay of over one year, the system is yet to be proven.

2011–12

Navy to navy level interaction and staff talks were held between India and Israel. BDL was nominated as the missile integrator for the LR-SAM missile— which was being developed jointly by DRDO and M/s IAI, Israel— for the Indian navy.

DRDO and IAI, Israel started a joint development programme on Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MR-SAM).

MR-SAM is a joint development programme of DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Israel for the Indian navy. It uses a dual-pulse rocket motor and active radar seeker in the terminal phase and inertial/mid-course update for guidance.

The weapon system would provide a point and area defence for three P15A ships of the Indian navy against a vast variety of aerial threats including fighter aircraft, subsonic and supersonic missiles, etc. 

On January 11, 2011, the sixth meeting of the India–Israel Sub Working Group on Defence Procurement, Production and Development took place.

Between January 31, 2011 and February 2, 2011, the seventh navy to navy staff talks were held in Israel. On May 15, 2011, the ninth meeting of the India–Israel Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation was held in Tel Aviv. On November 21–24, 2011, the chief of the Israeli air force visited India.

2013–14

Navy–to–navy level interaction and staff talks between India and Israel were held again. IAF procured SPYDER Low Level Quick Reaction Missile System for the protection of high-value assets (HVAs).

The contract for purchase was signed with M/s Rafael, Israel. Major export destinations for defence products have been Israel, along with other countries. There was a joint development programme between DRDO and the ministry of defence, Israel on an advanced electronic warfare suite for light combat aircraft. In 2013, DRDO held bilateral meetings with Israel.

On January 20–23, the India chief of air staff visited Israel. On May 20, 2013, major general Guy Zur, chief of ground forces, Israeli defence forces, visited India. On March 11, 2014, army to army, navy to navy and air force to air force staff talks were held in Israel.

Also read: UNHRC’s examination of India’s periodic report after 28 years: Part 8

On March 18–21, 2014, the Indian chief of army staff visited Israel. In February 2014, major general Dan Harel, director general, the Israeli ministry of defence, visited India.

2014–15

IAF procured a SPYDER Missile System from M/s Rafael, Israel. On November 10, 2014, LRSAM was successfully tested against a flying target at a range in Israel.

Designs of the various sub-systems and major elements on MR-SAM— a joint development programme of DRDO, IAF and IAI, Israel— with a range of 70 km, were completed. All MR-SAM functional prototypes were delivered and integrated at IAI, Israel.

Under a joint development programme between DRDO, MoD Israel and M/s Elisra, Israel, development, integration and evaluation of UEWS, which is an integrated radar warner and jammer (RWJ) system started.

Since 2008, about 62 percent of India’s defence imports (by value) have come from Russia; other top suppliers include France (11 percent), the United States (10 percent) and Israel (7 percent).

DRDO, along with the joint partner M/s Elisra, Israel started designing and developing a Dual Colour Missile Approach Warning System (DCMAWS) for Su-30 MKI aircraft.

DRDO held bilateral defence research and development meetings with Israel. On June 30, 2014, the eleventh meeting of the Israel–India Joint Working Group was held in Tel Aviv. The defence minister of Israel, Moshe (Bogie) Ya’alon, visited Aero India in 2015 in Bengaluru. He also met Prime Minister Modi.

2015–16

Medium power radars from Israel began to replace 1980s technology in India. On August 11–13, 2015, the eighth air staff talks between India and Israel were held in New Delhi.

From November 30 to December 3, 2015, the commander of the Israeli air and space forces visited India. On February 17–18, 2016, the director general of the Israeli defence ministry Dan Harel visited India. In March 2016, the Indian chief of air staff visited Israel.

2016–17

The Indian navy held staff talks on maritime cooperation and bilateral issues with Israel. Repair and overhaul projects regarding Su30-MKI, MG-21 BISON, Mig-27 aircraft, Jaguar, Kiran jet trainer, Mirage 2000 aircraft, Dornier (DO-228) and Avro (HS748) aircraft were undertaken.

Also read: The brutality in Gaza rekindles the horrible memories of women in war

Depot-level maintenance of UAV engines under the transfer of technology from IAI Malat, Israel was also undertaken. On July 13, 2016, the twelfth meeting of the Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation was held. In April 2016 the ninth India–Israel army staff talks were held in New Delhi.

2017–18

The army chief of Israel visited India. Indian navy western fleet ships Mumbai Trishul and Aditya proceeded on an overseas deployment to the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean in April–May 2017 and made port calls at Haifa (Israel).

The Indian navy has been engaging with various friendly foreign navies to conclude and sign agreements for the exchange of white shipping information. White shipping information is the exchange of information about the movement and identity of non-military commercial vessels. White shipping agreements have been signed with 13 countries, including Israel.

A contingent of the Indian army participated in Haifa Day Centenary on September 6, 2018, at Haifa, Israel, marking the liberation of Haifa from Ottoman Rule, thanks largely to a daring cavalry charge of Indian colonial troops acting in the service of British Imperialism.

On April 25–26, 2017, the thirteenth meeting of the bilateral Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation was held in Israel. On June 12–15, 2017, the chief of staff committee and chief of naval staff of Israel visited India.

From October 29–November 2, 2017, the chief of ground forces, Israel visited India. On November 5–16, 2017, India participated in the multilateral exercise blue flag held in Israel. On July 3, 2017, to commemorate 25 years of diplomatic relations between India and Israel, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses |(IDSA) organised a roundtable discussion on the special issue of strategic analysis ‘India–Israel Relations at 25’.

A contingent of the Indian army participated in Haifa Day Centenary on September 6, 2018, at Haifa, Israel. The day marks the liberation of Haifa from Ottoman Rule, thanks largely to a daring cavalry charge of Indian colonial troops acting in the service of British Imperialism.

IAF procured the SPYDER LLQRM systems from Israel. On July 8-12, 2018, there was a meeting to explore the possibilities for cooperation in the domain of coastal security between the Israeli navy and the Indian coast guard.

On May 22–24, 2018, a delegation led by the chief of air staff visited Israel. On July 2–3, 2018, the fourteenth Joint Working Group meeting with Israel was held in New Delhi. On March 26–28, annual staff talks between army, navy and air forces of the two countries took place. On March 10–14, 2019, a delegation led by the commander of the Israel Air Force visited India.

Also read: Interview with Adila Hassim, counsel for South Africa versus Israel before the ICJ

In March 2009, OFB concluded a contract with M/s Israel Military Industries (IMI), Israel for the supply of a manufacturing plant of Bi-Modular Charge System (BMCS) for Ordnance Factory Nalanda. However, the contract was put on hold by the Indian ministry of defence in June 2009 due to illegal gratification by M/s IMI Israel and the contract was finally cancelled in March 2012. Arms Contract corruption needs a major review

There has also been a delay in development and failure in meeting the user requirements of unmanned aerial vehicles that were introduced in the Indian army in 1998 through the import of Searcher Mark-I from Israel.

2019–20

On August 16–19, 2019, a delegation led by the commander of the Israel Air Force visited India. On November 11–13, 2019, the eleventh army to army staff talks between India and Israel were held in New Delhi. International Defence and Security Exhibition (ISDEF), 2019 was held on June 4–6, 2019 in Tel Aviv, Israel. From India, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML), Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Limited (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL) participated.

2020

Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh had a telephonic conversation with defence minister of Israel Lieutenant General Benjamin Gantz on July 24, 2020. Both ministers expressed satisfaction at the progress of strategic cooperation between the two countries and discussed possibilities of further strengthening the defence engagements.

They also expressed satisfaction at the ongoing collaboration in research and development in fighting COVID-19 pandemic which will not only benefit the two countries but also aid the larger humanitarian cause.

NSO says it sells its technologies solely to law enforcement and intelligence agencies of ‘vetted governments’ for the sole purpose of saving lives and preventing criminal and terror acts.

India’s defence minister also invited greater participation of Israeli defence companies under the new liberalised foreign direct investment (FDI) regime in defence manufacturing. The final production batch of MR-SAM for the Indian navy (LRSAM) was flagged off in February 2021.

2021–22

The eleventh India–Israel air staff talks were held virtually on June 10, 2021. The chief of air staff visited Israel from August 2–5, 2021.

The fifth meeting of the Joint Working Group on Military Cooperation between India and Israel, co-chaired by the defence secretary, was held on October 26–27 2021 in Israel. IAF participated in the Exercise Blue Flag held in Israel from October 10–28, 2021.

Also read: Labour export to Israel circumvents India’s safety protocol

Not surprisingly, there is no mention of Israel in the annual report for 2023.

A few concerns

Export licences

There is no information in the public domain as to whether any of the export licences from India have any conditionality against usage against civilians in combat zones.

Pegasus and illegal surveillance

Former member of Parliament from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), K.K. Ragesh posed a number of pointed questions to the government: How did the Pegasus spyware come to India? Why were people “fighting against the government” targeted? How can one believe that the government has no role to play in bringing the software for snooping on political leaders in the country?

Niv, Shalev and Omri Group Technologies (NSO), an Israeli company, claims it sells its technologies solely to law enforcement and intelligence agencies of ‘vetted governments’ for the sole purpose of saving lives and preventing criminal and terror acts.

Fate of Indian workers in West Asia

What happens if there is an all-out war in the next few weeks in West Asia? Is India prepared for the return of the nine million Indian workers in the region? Workers’ remittances are the largest constituent of current receipts after merchandise exports and finance— more than 15 percent of current payments since 2001.

Has the Indian government stipulated in the contracts of Indian workers going to Israel that they will not be used for work in the Occupied Territories— particularly in the building of the illegal settlements there?

Also read: Shh, don’t support the official Indian position on Palestine or Section 153A IPC will be imposed on you!

Has the Indian government stipulated in the contracts of Indian workers going to Israel that they will not be used for work in the Occupied Territories— particularly in the building of the illegal settlements there?

UNFIL

Has the Indian government directly or through the UN sought assurances for the safety of Indian contingents posted as part of United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNFIL) in Lebanon and the Golan Heights on the Israeli-Syrian border? This is no idle fear as the Irish contingent has received warnings from Israel to move away from the area.

Intelligence cooperation

There has been much covert cooperation between India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Mossad. Both spook organisations are not under the control of their respective Parliaments as in more mature democracies. Little information is available in the public domain about their modus operandi.

Kashmir

Israeli drones are used in Kashmir (one unmanned aerial vehicle called the Heron was specially adapted for such use). Indian forces used Israeli Tavor rifles in 2008, used Spice-2000 guidance technology in the aftermath of the Pulwama attacks in Kashmir in 2019, and bought Pegasus from Israel that same year.

Israeli diplomats have been visiting Kashmir regularly. More troubling is the alleged presence of Israeli Intelligence operatives during interrogations of those detained in the Valley.

However, the greatest concern is the total disregard for the laws of war by the Israeli army. It has put the clock backward on humanitarian law since Grotius or earlier.

Conclusion

Given the depth and breadth of Indo-Israeli cooperation outlined above, nothing short of a major political upheaval and a sea change in public opinion in India is going to substantially alter matters.

The reference here is that a mere change of hats between the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the INDIA will be Tweedledum and Tweedledee. The level of cooperation also exposes all non-BJP parties and forces for not having comprehensively debated these issues in Parliament and the public domain.

Israeli diplomats have been visiting Kashmir regularly. More troubling is the alleged presence of Israeli Intelligence operatives during interrogations of those detained in the Valley.

Civil society and secular society efforts at solidarity with Palestine have been vacuous, to say the least in India. They have not been able to mount an effective boycott or disinvestment policy against Indian and international entities aiding and abetting Israel!

We are dealing with the sons and daughters of Moloch, not Abraham.

Read Part 1 here.

Read Part 2 here.

Read Part 3 here.

Ravi Nair

The writer is the executive director, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre.

The Israel arms trade: Emerging legal benchmarks

India’s arms sales to Israel: Bad legally, worse ethically—Part 3

The Israel arms trade: Emerging legal benchmarks

Ravi Nair·October 1, 2024

Part 3 of a four-part deep-dive into the recent case before the Supreme Court of India calling for a halt to arms sale to Israel as it commits genocide against the Palestinians.

—

Read Part 1 here.

Read Part 2 here.

UNITED Nations experts have repeatedly demanded a halt to the transfer of weapons and ammunition to Israel. They have stated that such arms transfers may “constitute serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian laws and risk State complicity in international crimes, possibly including genocide”.

Some of the many companies they have identified are “BAE Systems, Boeing, Caterpillar, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Oshkosh, Rheinmetall AG, Rolls-Royce Power Systems, RTX, and ThyssenKrupp”.

“These companies, by sending weapons, parts, components, and ammunition to Israeli forces, risk being complicit in serious violations of international human rights and international humanitarian laws,” the experts have said.

“In this context, continuing arms transfers to Israel may be seen as knowingly providing assistance for operations that contravene international human rights and international humanitarian laws and may result in profit from such assistance,” they have added.

The Arms Export Control Act (1976) establishes the framework for the US government to approve or deny export licences for military equipment and arms.

The financial institutions investing in these arms companies are “Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung, Amundi Asset Management, Bank of America, BlackRock, Capital Group, Causeway Capital Management, Citigroup, Fidelity Management & Research, INVESCO Ltd, JP Morgan Chase, Harris Associates, Morgan Stanley, Norges Bank Investment Management, Newport Group, Raven’s Wing Asset Management, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, State Street Corporation, Union Investment Privatfonds, The Vanguard Group, Wellington and Wells Fargo & Company.”

Efforts at disinvestment must be supplemented by judicial efforts both at the national and international law. What have been the efforts so far?

United States of America— applicable law

The Leahy Law refers to two provisions— one applicable to the secretary of State and the other to the department of defence— that prohibit the United States government from assisting foreign security forces when there is “credible information” that the recipient forces are committing gross violations of human rights.

Also read: The UNHRC concluding observations do not allow for semantics

The provision related to the secretary of state is codified as Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act (1961), while the provision related to the department of defence is codified as Section 362 of Title 10 of the US Code.

In this regard, upon the designation of such assistance being provided, the relevant department conducts a review of the recipient forces or units and submits a review— confirming or rejecting the proposal to export arms and equipment to the recipient country.

Additionally, the Arms Export Control Act (1976) establishes the framework for the US government to approve or deny export licences for military equipment and arms.

These decisions consider factors such as “whether the export would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or non-proliferation agreements or other arrangements”.

In this regard, military equipment and arms are only to be sold to friendly countries for purposes such as “internal security” and “legitimate self-defence”.

The court dismissed the petition but still implored the US government to “examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza”.

Notably, there have already been previous complaints that this criterion has not been met by Israeli military actions in the occupied Palestinian territories; however, no further action or review took place.

A senior State department official Josh Paul resigned from the bureau that oversees arms transfers to foreign nations, citing his objection to continued US military assistance to Israel as its retaliatory bombardment and blockade of Gaza exacerbate a humanitarian crisis there. Paul was the director of congressional and public affairs at the Bureau of Political–Military Affairs.

Regarding Israel

On January 31, 2024, the US district court in Northern California dismissed a case filed against the US President and the secretary of defence alleging violations of international law.

Also read: ‘Flag of freedom’ should fly ‘not only for ourselves’: Gaza and India’s constitutional responsibility

The plaintiffs contended that the US government had failed to uphold its obligations under the Genocide Convention by supplying military equipment and arms to Israel. They also sought an injunction to halt any further military or financial support, aid, or assistance to Israel.

The court, while referencing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case of South Africa versus Israel, determined that the issues raised were fundamentally non-justiciable political questions.

These foreign policy matters were deemed beyond the scope of judicial review and were left exclusively to the executive and legislative branches, which had already decided to grant military assistance to Israel. As a result, the court dismissed the petition but still implored the US government to “examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza”.

Given the wide scope of the ‘political questions doctrine’, it seems unlikely that future legal challenges will be successful. No such iron-clad prohibition exists in India.

European Union— applicable law

As members of the European Union, States must adhere to the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, alongside their other international and domestic obligations.

Article 2 of this text outlines eight criteria for evaluating arms transfer authorisations: (i) compliance with international obligations, especially sanctions and embargoes, (ii) the recipient country’s international human rights law and humanitarian law record, (iii) internal situation of the recipient country, including aggravating factors, (iv) impact on regional peace, security and stability, (v) national security considerations of member states, (vi) recipient country’s behaviour, particularly regarding support for terrorist groups, (vii) risk of arms diversion to unauthorised parties, and (viii) compatibility of the equipment with the recipient country’s technical and economic capacity.

Regarding Israel— The Netherlands

On February 12, 2024, the Hague Court of Appeal directed the Dutch government to cease supplying Israel with F-35 fighter jet parts, citing a “clear risk” of serious international humanitarian law violations.

Also read: India arms exports: A protection of civilians lens is required

The court based its decision on the EU Common Position and the Arms Trade Treaty, applying these to Dutch law. Notably, this ruling overturned a lower court’s dismissal of the same petition.

The lower court had found no additional obligation to review or conduct new risk assessments for authorised exports, even if circumstances had changed.

The court rejected these arguments, emphasising the paramount importance of compliance with the Geneva Conventions and the Arms Trade Treaty.

The Dutch government had argued that it should be granted a wide margin of appreciation in matters of national security and foreign policy. This argument aimed to preserve the decision-making authority of the ministry of foreign affairs and the Central Import and Export Office; the statutory bodies responsible for granting export authorisations.

However, the court rejected these arguments, emphasising the paramount importance of compliance with the Geneva Conventions and the Arms Trade Treaty. This did not seem to be the reasoning in India!

With procedural defences exhausted, the court examined Israel’s track record of military operations and attacks. Based on numerous reports from UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it concluded there was a ‘clear risk’ of international humanitarian law violations.

The court clarified that the applicable threshold for such authorisations is one of possibility and risk, as definitive judgments would require a “careful factual investigation” not currently feasible.

Nevertheless, it held that the State’s obligation to prevent even the possibility of such violations persists. Therefore, it ordered a halt to all exports of F-35 parts to Israel.

While some argue this imposes an additional obligation for fresh risk assessments for previously granted licences, potentially expanding the interpretation of the EU Common Position, the court noted that the export authorisation was granted indefinitely.

It reasoned that if indefinite licences were not subject to review, it would undermine the very purpose of the EU Common Position. Ultimately, this decision merely aligns the Netherlands with other EU States— Spain, Italy and Belgium – that had previously halted arms exports on similar grounds.

Also read: Will the tiny sparks of student protests in India rekindle the flame of India’s historical support for Palestine?

Two export licences for ammunition for Israel were put on hold for the export of gunpowder to Israel. An Italian foreign ministry source confirmed on May 9, 2024 that Italy had halted new export approvals since the start of the Gaza war.

Under Italian law, arms exports are banned to countries that are waging war and those deemed to be violating international human rights law.

Italy provided 0.9 percent of Israel’s imported arms in 2019–23, according to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report, including helicopters and naval artillery.

In North America, Canada has suspended arms sales to Israel while Japan from Asia has also done so. “Many other nations have said they will no longer purchase Israeli weapons,” as per a report in Al Jazeera.

Regarding Israel— Germany

On June 10, 2024, the Berlin Administrative Court resolved not to impose a provisional prohibition on the German government’s supply of military equipment and arms to Israel.

This decision aligns with the recent case brought by Nicaragua against Germany at the ICJ, where the ICJ similarly refrained from indicating any provisional measures.

The ICJ’s stance was influenced by Germany’s robust domestic legal framework governing the export of war weapons and other military equipment, which was deemed sufficient to mitigate any potential risks. Additionally, 98 percent of the export licences granted to Israel since October 7, 2023 pertained to military equipment other than war weapons, eliminating the immediate need for the court to intervene with provisional measures.

Given the wide scope of the ‘political questions doctrine’, it seems unlikely that future legal challenges will be successful. No such iron-clad prohibition exists in India.

Regarding its domestic legal framework, the War Weapons Control Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act regulate the arms export regime. For war weapons, the ministry of economy, in consultation with other relevant ministries (such as the federal ministry of defence), makes decisions to authorise or reject export licences.

Also read: UNHRC’s examination of India’s periodic report after 28 years: Part 8

Additionally, more substantial and controversial decisions are referred to the Federal Security Council, which is composed of the relevant ministers for further discussion and analysis. Notably, Section 6 of the War Weapons Control Act outlines the specific grounds for the refusal of permits.

Regardless, the Berlin Administrative Court declared the petition procedurally inadmissible. The court observed that its purview extended only to reviewing executive actions that have already occurred or are imminent.

As the German government had not authorised any arms transfers in 2024, and with no such authorisations on the horizon, the request for a provisional ‘preventive’ measure was deemed outside the court’s jurisdiction, reserved solely for exceptional cases.

Moreover, the court observed that the government would make “well-informed decisions on a case-by-case basis”, carefully balancing Germany’s foreign and security policy interests with its national and international legal obligations, thereby negating any immediate risk warranting judicial relief.

While the court refrained from delving into the substantive merits of potential violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law involving German arms and equipment, it nonetheless left open the possibility of challenging future arms exports.

Should the German government authorise such exports, these challenges could be addressed both in subsequent legal proceedings and during the merits phase of the ongoing case.

Lessons for challenging arms exports from India

The applicable legal frameworks as well as the specific judicial proceedings in the United States of America, the Netherlands and Germany offer significant lessons for potential complaints against Indian arms exports to Israel. They are as follows:

Firstly, India is a party to the Geneva Conventions and has incorporated its obligations under the Geneva Conventions Act, 1960, binding it to follow the interpretation of Common Article 1 (CA1) which creates a preventive obligation from assisting and facilitating grave breaches.

While the court refrained from delving into the substantive merits of potential violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law involving German arms and equipment, it nonetheless left open the possibility of challenging future arms exports.

Additionally, India is obligated to follow customary international law, particularly regarding the framework of responsibility outlined in Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility.

Also read: The brutality in Gaza rekindles the horrible memories of women in war

Therefore, India must ensure that its military equipment and arms are not used to commit violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Failing to properly assess and complete risk assessments may lead to breaches of these international obligations.

Secondly, the US case can be distinguished from India’s scenario, as Indian administrative laws are considerably more far-reaching than their US counterparts. In India, judicial review of executive action is permitted in a greater number of cases; however, the government retains a wide margin of appreciation regarding its foreign policy matters.

Additionally, the German case can also be distinguished as the Indian government has continued to supply military equipment and arms to Israel throughout the conflict.

Moreover, India has signaled an increase in cooperation, in stark contrast to the European position of reducing and preventing even the mere possibility of violations. This creates an immediate need for judicial review to prevent further human rights violations.

Thirdly, information surrounding military equipment and arms export licences is shrouded in mystery, with very little publicly available data. The department of defence production usually authorises such export licenses as they fall under Category 6 of the Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list.

However, if the goods are dual-use, they fall under the jurisdiction of the directorate general of foreign trade (DGFT) for proper authorisation. SCOMET licence applications that are publicly available do not list specific details of the goods being sought for approval, for security concerns.

Nonetheless, the Inter-Ministerial Working Group under the DGFT is responsible for adjudicating such applications for SCOMET licences, relying on six grounds outlined in Rule 10.06(I) of the procedure handbook.

These grounds include obligations under general international law as well as specific agreements, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Given the possibility of serious international crimes and international human rights and humanitarian law violations taking place in the above-mentioned conflicts, it is likely that these criteria are not being met for proper export authorisations.

Domestic jurisdiction

There is an urgent need on the part of civil society in India to seek legal review and challenge the Indian State and business and banking enterprises that help arm Israel, facilitate atrocities and prolong the armed conflict.

Also read: Interview with Adila Hassim, counsel for South Africa versus Israel before the ICJ

Civil society could do right to information applications, file administrative cases, encourage parliamentary and public discussion that seek the review of licencing decisions by arms-transfer regulators such as the DGFT, that permit the sale of arms to congenital violators such as Israel.

It reasoned that if indefinite licences were not subject to review, it would undermine the very purpose of the EU Common Position.

As 2024 ends, there is scarce understanding in India within the judiciary, political parties, Parliament or civil society on corporate responsibility in the arms trade, underlining citizens at the center of arms control debate and ensuring that the Indian State and businesses uphold humane values and constitutional responsibilities.

India has no public record of interagency cooperation with the arms industry with regard to meaningful human rights due diligence processes by both State and businesses, aimed at preventing human rights violations.

The arms sector’s regulatory framework across the world is built around the responsibility of home states as licensors of arms transfers; respect for human rights, therefore, currently depends on the robustness of States’ human rights commitments, which in India is not something that you can mention in dispatches.

What is to be done?

There is a need for the development of national export control legislation governing the arms sector to include reference to the standalone responsibility of all businesses in the sector to conduct human rights due diligence in line with the UN Guiding Principles.

Independent oversight of arms transfers through parliamentary committees and judicial commissions must be established. This could also be done by independent mechanisms such as national human rights institutions. Except these institutions in India are caricatures of what they ought to be.

There is a need for the development of national export control legislation governing the arms sector. 

Victims of human rights violations originating in the arms sector must be granted legal standing to join legal actions against arms companies, in criminal and civil proceedings and public interest litigation.

There must be meaningful public communication and outreach mechanisms to share information about risk assessments in export licence approval decisions. It is a long road to justice anywhere, but in India it is akin to climbing a glass mountain. New Delhi is in strange company with other merchants of death.

Read Part 1 here.

Read Part 2 here.

Next week: India–Israel arms relations: Deep and dangerous for Indian democracy

Ravi Nair

The writer is the executive director, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre.

India’s arms sales to Israel: Bad legally, worse ethically—Part 1

India’s arms sales to Israel: Bad legally, worse ethically—Part 1

Ravi Nair·September 17, 2024

Part 1 of a four-part deep-dive into the recent case before the Supreme Court of India calling for a halt to arms sale to Israel as it commits genocide against the Palestinians.

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THE Supreme Court of India’s judgment of September 9, 2024 on refusing to halt arms sales to Israel during the ongoing conflict in Gaza and West Bank is baffling, to say the least.

The court was not the only party that lacked in terms of its focus on the case, as pleadings also needed more substance. The interventions on the part of the Solicitor General of India (SGI) Tushar Mehta only served to reveal how much the State representative was at sea with the subject before the court.

To better understand the dispute, it is important to know the boundaries of extant law and the nuances of soft law and hard law.

Arms transfers to Israel violate international humanitarian law

On February 23, 2024, United Nations (UN) experts stated that “any transfer of weapons or ammunition to Israel that would be used in Gaza is likely to violate international humanitarian law and must cease immediately”.

“All States must ‘ensure respect’ for international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict, as required by 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law,” the experts said.

On February 23, 2024, United Nations (UN) experts stated “any transfer of weapons or ammunition to Israel that would be used in Gaza is likely to violate international humanitarian law and must cease immediately”.

“States must accordingly refrain from transferring any weapon or ammunition – or parts for them – if it is expected, given the facts or past patterns of behaviour, that they would be used to violate international law.

“Such transfers are prohibited even if the exporting State does not intend the arms to be used in violation of the law— or does not know with certainty that they would be used in such a way— as long as there is a clear risk,” they said.

Also read: ‘Flag of freedom’ should fly ‘not only for ourselves’: Gaza and India’s constitutional responsibility

The duty to “ensure respect” for humanitarian law applies “in all circumstances”, including when Israel claims it is countering terrorism. Military intelligence must also not be shared where there is a clear risk that it would be used to violate international humanitarian law.

International treaties and conventions

Common Article 1 (CA1) of the Geneva Conventions mandates that parties “undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” While a debate persists over the precise scope of the obligation to “respect”, it is widely accepted that it prohibits States’ complicity in international humanitarian law violations, including through arms supply or other means.

For instance, this interpretation is supported by Germany’s position in its International Court of Justice (ICJ) proceedings with Nicaragua. Germany acknowledged that CA1 imposes, at minimum, a duty to conduct “proper risk assessment” before exporting military equipment and arms.

India signed the Geneva Conventions on November 29, 1949. The country was one of the sixty-three States which signed the final Act, incorporating the four Geneva Conventions. They were ratified only 10 years later by India on August 27, 1959.

In a written reply to a parliamentary question, the government of India stated, “The principles embodied in the convention are part of general international law and therefore already part of the common law of India.”

“The provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the procedural law (Code of Criminal Procedure) provide effective penalties for persons guilty of such category of crime and take cognisance of the acts which may otherwise be taken to be in the nature of genocide, as culpable offences,” the reply further stated.

India ratified the Genocide Convention on November 9, 1950, and after ratifying it, in 1959 came with an important reservation to Article IX of the convention. The reservation dealt with not accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the event of differences in interpretation of what constituted genocide. It brought no concomitant domestic legislation and has not made the necessary changes in domestic criminal law.

India and Geneva Conventions, 1949

The Geneva Conventions lay down the rules of war, a part of these conventions include the Geneva Conventions Act of 1960, which India ratified in 1959. In spite of having ratified the Geneva Conventions then, it took rather long for India to transpose them into its domestic law.

Also read: India arms exports: A protection of civilians lens is required

However, the Act contained a hobbling provision (Section 17) which stated, “No court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except on complaint by the government or of such officer of the government as the Central government may by notification specify.

The duty to “ensure respect” for humanitarian law applies “in all circumstances”, including when Israel claims it is countering terrorism.

This was not mentioned by the Supreme Court for dismissal of the said petition and, evidently, it was not brought to the notice of the court by the SGI. One plausible reason is that the government of India would be saved from the embarrassment that it had yet to gazette the Rules to give effect to the 1960 Act till date, only 64 years later!

Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts

Furthermore, CA1 aligns with Article 16 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, establishing a responsibility for all States to refrain from supplying military equipment and arms that are likely to be used in, or facilitate, serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.

India, as a State party to the four Geneva Conventions, is bound by their provisions. Moreover, these conventions’ norms are recognised as customary international law and jus cogens. Similarly, Article 16 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 is considered a codification of customary law. Thus, India, according to Article 51 of its Constitution, is required to abide by its international obligations.

The Supreme chose to ignore universal jurisdiction

“State officials involved in arms exports may be individually criminally liable for aiding and abetting any war crimes, crimes against humanity or acts of genocide,” the experts said.

“All States under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the International Criminal Court, may be able to investigate and prosecute such crimes,” they added.

The Indian government in abdication of its international duties

The United Nations experts stressed that the duty to “ensure respect” additionally requires all States to do everything reasonably in their power to prevent and stop violations of international humanitarian law by Israel, particularly where a State has influence through its political, military, economic or other relations.

Also read: Will the tiny sparks of student protests in India rekindle the flame of India’s historical support for Palestine?

These measures could include:

“Diplomatic dialogue and protests;

– Technical assistance to promote compliance and accountability;

– Sanctions on trade, finance, travel, technology or cooperation;

– Referral to the Security Council and the General Assembly;

– Proceedings at the International Court of Justice;

– Support for investigations by the International Criminal Court or other international legal mechanisms;

– National criminal investigations using universal jurisdiction and civil suits; and

– Requesting a meeting of the parties to the Geneva Conventions.”

Most of these measures are also relevant to fulfilling the duty to prevent genocide.

No exemption for Indian arms companies

Arms companies contributing to the production and transfer of arms to Israel and businesses investing in those companies bear their own responsibility to respect human rights, international humanitarian law and international criminal law.

“They have not publicly demonstrated the heightened human rights due diligence required of them and accordingly risk complicity in violations,” the experts said.

The government of India is yet to gazette the Rules to give effect to the 1960 Act to date, only 64 years later!

“International law does not enforce itself,” the experts said. “All States must not be complicit in international crimes through arms transfers. They must do their part to urgently end the unrelenting humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.”

The Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force on December 24, 2014, established the first comprehensive international legal framework governing the export of military equipment and arms. India, however, has neither signed nor showcased any intention to do so, having abstained during its adoption vote.

Also read: The brutality in Gaza rekindles the horrible memories of women in war

India’s position stems from concerns that the treaty’s framework is overly restrictive for imports related to national security, arguing that such strategic considerations should remain within the purview of individual States. The argumentation is weak but a refutation of the Indian position will be provided in this series later.

Article 6 of the treaty outlines three key prohibitions on arms exports: (i) if it violates United Nations Security Council measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly arms embargoes, (ii) if it contravenes relevant international obligations of international agreements of the involved parties, and (iii) if it is potentially used for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or in the commission of other serious international crimes.

Notably, such obligations hinge on the exporting State’s ‘knowledge’ that the arms could be used for future international law violations, making the export itself unlawful.

This differs from Article 16-based complicity, which only deems arms exports unlawful if they facilitate the actual commission of international humanitarian law breaches.

In this regard, States have acknowledged this difference, interpreting ‘knowledge’ to mean that a transfer should not be authorised if there are substantial grounds to believe that the arms would be used unlawfully in the future.

Therefore, this interpretation broadens State obligations, requiring more comprehensive risk assessments and investigations to prevent the mere possibility of international humanitarian law and international human rights law violations.

As the situation in Palestine continues to worsen, numerous institutions have comprehensively documented war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law being committed by the parties involved in the conflict.

Given these circumstances, the knowledge threshold for such obligations has likely been met. This creates corresponding duties for States to take immediate action.

Also read: ICJ ruling in South Africa versus Israel: An explainer

At a minimum, States should temporarily suspend all arms exports to the region and simultaneously conduct thorough investigations into the use of their previously exported arms in this conflict.

All States under the principle of universal jurisdiction, and the International Criminal Court, may be able to investigate and prosecute such crimes.

Additionally, information surrounding military equipment and arms export licences is shrouded in mystery, with very little publicly available data. In India, the Department of Defence Production usually authorises such export licences as they fall under Category 6 of the Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list.

However, if the goods are dual-use, they fall under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) for proper authorisation. The SCOMET licence applications that are publicly available do not list specific details of the goods being sought for approval, for security concerns.

Nonetheless, the Inter-Ministerial Working Group under the DGFT is responsible for adjudicating such applications for SCOMET licences, relying on six grounds outlined in Rule 10.06 (I) of the Procedure Handbook.

These grounds include obligations under general international law as well as specific agreements, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement. Given the possibility of serious international crimes and international humanitarian law/ international human rights law violations taking place in the Gaza conflict, it is unlikely that these criteria are being met for proper export authorisations.

Wassenaar arrangement

The Wassenaar Arrangement, established on July 12, 1996, is a voluntary export control regime aimed at “promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies”.

India is a participating State in the Wassenaar Arrangement and regularly contributes to the development of guidelines and procedures.

Accordingly, its obligations are not legally binding. Regardless, India is a participating State, regularly contributing to the development of guidelines and procedures.

At its core, the arrangement requires States to submit reports on their arms transfers, participate in voluntary information exchanges and notify other State parties on their export activities.

Also read: Interview with Adila Hassim, counsel for South Africa versus Israel before the ICJ

It involves two lists:

(i) Munitions List which requires States to exchange information on deliveries of conventional arms to non-Wassenaar members that fall under eight broad weapon categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery, military aircraft/unmanned aerial vehicles, military and attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small arms and light weapons.

(ii) Dual-Use Goods and Technologies List which requires States to submit information on export licences that were denied within mandated timelines depending on the sensitivity of the items. These lists form the foundation of the agreement’s information-sharing mechanisms.

In addition to the required information exchanges, State parties have adopted non-binding criteria for the export of small arms and light weapons, and other military equipment, aiming to incorporate these best practices into their national laws.

States have acknowledged this difference, interpreting ‘knowledge’ to mean that a transfer should not be authorised if there are substantial grounds to believe that the arms would be used unlawfully in the future.

For instance, Article 2 of the Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2022) outlines scenarios in which States should avoid issuing export licences.

These scenarios include potential threats to “compliance with international law governing the conduct of armed conflict” and the risk of such arms being used to “violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

Similar guidelines exist for all conventional weapons and dual-use goods intended for military use. However, these guidelines are advisory and non-binding for States. 

Next week: Law of contracts weightier than humanitarian law

Ravi Nair

The writer is the executive director, South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre.

Abdul Ghafoor Noorani— In memoriam

Ravi Nair·August 30, 2024

A.G. Noorani was an observant Muslim, he had not an iota of sectarianism in him. He was a great Indian and a greater human being, writes Ravi Nair in this personal note.

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IT is not easy writing about A.G. Noorani who passed away on August 29, 2024. The obituaries in the media have been fulsome in praise and rightly so.

I had started reading his articles in late 1977. I found them most educative as I thirsted for information on human rights issues. Most of the articles then appearing in the print media were mainly anecdotal, Noorani was one of the few who wrote substantively with a deep grasp of both domestic law in India and international human rights law.

At some point in 1981, I had gone to Bombay to see a lawyer associated with the then-Indian chapter of Amnesty International. He had asked me to meet him in the high court Bar library. As we were leaving the library, he pointed to a gentleman reading a book in a corner and whispered to me, “That is A.G. Noorani.”

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Abdul Ghafoor Noorani— In memoriamRead More »

The UNHRC concluding observations do not allow for semantics

Ravi Nair·August 22, 2024

The concluding part of the analysis of the audit of India’s human rights report after 28 years by the United Nations Human Rights Council. 

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Read Part 1 here.

RECENTLY, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) did an audit of India’s human rights report after twenty-eight years.

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the-unhrc-concluding-observations-do-not-allow-for-semantics/Read More »