Since September 1988, when the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) came to power, approximately one million Burmese nationals have fled to neighboring states. Approximately 55,000 Burmese nationals are currently in India, however, of that number, only about 467 are recognized and protected refugees of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in India. This report focuses on the plight of Burmese refugees in India, in particular, the predicament of Burmese nationals who remain unrecognized and unassisted in the North Eastern frontier, and the situation of the refugee population in Delhi.
Methodology
Most of the data for this report was gathered over a three month period encompassing May, June, and July 1997. About sixty in-depth interviews were conducted with UNHCR officials, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, Burmese refugee leaders, and Burmese refugees. In this report, the term “Burmese refugee” includes all nationals (including ethnic minorities) living within the territory known as Burma or Myanmar.
This examination bears in mind the provisions of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UNHCR guidelines, and other related international instruments.
This article provides only a highlight of the treatment received by the Burmese refugees at the hands of the Government of India, its armed forces, and the UNHCR. For a more detailed examination, please refer to the full report, from which this piece has been extracted.
Burmese Nationals in India
Student Activists
After the military crackdown in September 1988, up to 1000 students and youth fled to India, arriving in the North Eastern states of Manipur and Mizoram. A few weeks after the first students arrived in the country, the Government of India announced that as long as their lives were in danger, it would not turn any of them back. Since issuing that statement, with only few exceptions, the Government of India has demonstrated a lack of concern for their plight.
The Camps
Of those Burmese who fled to India, most arrived in Moreh, a border town in Manipur. They spent several nights to several weeks in the police station until refugee camps were set up. The experiences of Burmese refugees in Manipur, are highlighted below.
Refugee camps were initially set up close to the border, however, after threats from Myanmar’s army, refugees were shifted to Leiken camp, in Chandel District. At the Leiken camp, “We felt like prisoners” said Soe Myint, Executive Committee Member of the Delhi-based All Burma Student’s League (ABSL). Without receiving adequate food, water, or medical attention, they contracted malaria, dysentery, and diarrhea. After the media exposed that money provided by the Government of India to meet the basic needs of the refugees had been embezzled by local officials, reporters were forbidden from meeting with the refugees.
Refugees caught sneaking out of the camp to contact their associates, conduct political activities, or to purchase medical and food supplies were beaten and sent to Manipur Central Jail. They were charged under the Foreigner’s Act and received jail sentences of up to one and a half years. Fortunately, a group of Indian lawyers secured their release and brought them to UNHCR in Delhi. After about two months, most were granted refugee status and financial support, becoming the first UNHCR-recognized Burmese refugees.
At one time, official registration at the Leikun camp reached several hundred refugees. Besides 80 students who were forcibly deported by the Manipur authorities in March 1989, others secretly left the camp to continue their political struggle elsewhere, in Northern Burma, Bangladesh or Delhi. The camp is still open in 1997, however, less than thirty people remain there.
North East India
No one knows exactly how many Burmese nationals are in the Indo-Burma border areas, although there are over 40,000 displaced Burmese of Chin ethnicity in Mizoram State alone. Accurate numbers do not exist because the region is isolated and remote, and the refugees do not identify themselves as such for fear of harassment, arrest or deportation.
Prior to 1990, most migrants were single males who were easily absorbed into the local economy. Employment opportunities in the North East has since shrunk dramatically. In Champhai, Mizoram the frustration and resentment of the local population has spilled over to the newcomers.
Mizoram Crackdowns
Starting in 1994, arrests and massive deportations of Burmese nationals began occurring in the border region. According to the Chin Refugee Committee (CRC), more than 10,000 Chin political refugees were taken in lorries by the Mizoram Police to Champhai, Saiha, and Cerhlun (small towns and villages situated on the border). Fortunately, many of the refugees were able to surreptitiously escape before being deported.
In June 1995, tensions between the local Mizo population and Burmese Chins again increased after Mizoram newspapers reported that the President of a village unit of the Young Mizo Association (YMA), had been shot and killed by three members of the Chin National Front (CNF). A reign of police terror and massive arrests followed. According to local newspapers, Mr Lalsangzuala, Home Minister of the Mizoram State Government, attended a youth rally in Aizawl and told all Burmese nationals to leave Mizoram.
Tensions worsened after 9 August 1996, when a Mizo pastor was shot in Champhai District. Over the next few days, the CID arrested at least fifteen Chins from Aizawl without laying any formal charges. Many of those detained were tortured. Lian No Thang, a 20-year resident of Aizawl, was threatened by the Mizoram State CID on the 10 and 11 August and was told to leave Mizoram by 13 August 1996.
Many observers note with concern the upcoming 1998 Mizoram state elections. These are likely to create even more problems for the Burmese nationals, particularly when people register to vote and when campaigns with anti-foreigner themes are launched.
Indo-Burma Relations
Many refugee and humanitarian groups believe that the Government of India is now more concerned about normalizing diplomatic relations and improving trade between the two countries than it is about the lives of tens of thousands of Burmese refugees now living within it borders.
With only few exceptions, India’s diplomatic and trade relationship with SLORC has been steadily improving. For example, in August 1992, the first high-level meeting between India and Myanmar took place since 1987. Again in 1995 and 1996, several sectoral and national level meetings were held to create mechanisms for “curbing and containing insurgency” in the border region and to open up cross-border trade. On 12 April 1995, a series of joint military campaigns, known as “Operation Golden Bird” were launched to quell border insurgency. In August 1996, twelve Burmese refugees (including 6 UNHCR-protected refugees) were refouled.
UNHCR – Delhi
UNHCR’s mandate to protect and assist refugees extends only to
those living in Delhi. Even so, many refugee and humanitarian groups believe that the UNHCR-recognized refugees are receiving inadequate assistance for fear that better treatment will result in a mass exodus of refugees from the North East to Delhi. As stated in a letter of 4 December 1995 from D McNamara, Director, Division of International
Protection, UNHCR Geneva:
“UNHCR would be ready to assist the Chin refugees in the Mizoram state if allowed to do so by the authorities. However, we do not believe that individual assistance in New Delhi would address the plight of the group. It might on the contrary aggravate the situation by drawing large numbers of refugees to New Delhi where we do not have the capacity or resources to meet their needs adequately.”
As of June 1997 there were 467 officially-recognized Burmese refugees in the country. Most of the UNHCR-recognized refugees are student activists who left Burma during the 1988 uprising.
In Delhi, the refugees are concentrated in the western suburb, Janakpuri. Recognized Burmese refugees comprise a small minority in a total UNHCR caseload of about 25,000, the majority of whom are Afghans.
Legal Issues
Legal Standing
Unlike Tibetan refugees, the Government of India does not permit Burmese refugees to acquire residential and other legal documents. In the North East, displaced Burmese nationals experience deportation, extortion, and harassment because they lack formal legal status. Even UNHCR-recognized refugees experience considerable hardship and problems. Without formal legal standing in India, they cannot assimilate and find secure employment.
Legal Aid and Advocacy
In 1996, UNHCR sub-contracted the Public Interest Legal Support And Research Center (PILSARC) (an Indian NGO) to provide legal services to the refugees.
According to a UNHCR Legal Officer, refugees can approach their office with legal problems and will be referred, if necessary, to PILSARC. However, not one refugee SAHRDC spoke with, including community leaders, had ever heard of the group or consulted with them.
Rejections
Many refugees are so disillusioned with the UNHCR that they are convinced that official refugee status is only arbitrarily awarded. Refugee groups and NGOs involved in Burmese affairs are unclear as to UNHCR’s criteria and procedures to bestow or deny refugee status. Many refugees interviewed by SAHRDC complained of unfair treatment during their UNHCR interview.
Many Burmese refugees who had fed to India in 1988 but who did not apply for UNHCR status until 1994 or after told SAHRDC that they were either viewed suspiciously, rejected, or not awarded financial assistance. As the refugees explained to SAHRDC, some did not immediately travel to Delhi to apply for official status because prior to then, they had been relatively secure. Until the crackdowns began, most preferred to remain in Mizoram or Manipur where they could speak the local languages, blend in, work, and be closer to home.
Appeals and Legal Recourse for Refugees
According to UNHCR’s global guidelines, any refugee claimant may appeal a negative decision concerning refugee status. UNHCR must also inform the claimant why his/her application has been rejected.
In at least three cases, SAHRDC was told that the claimants were not given any reasons why their applications were refused. On condition of anonymity, an UNHCR staff member told SAHRDC that UNHCR in India does not reveal the reason for rejection to applicants because “it sparks debate.”
SAHRDC was able to interview one of the claimants whose application was refused by UNHCR. Lia Lian Thang (R 3883) was forced to flee to India in 1992 because his brother was involved in the CNF. He arrived in Delhi in January 1993 and participated in a hunger strike when his UNHCR application was rejected. He was interviewed twice and rejected both times. He went to UNHCR ten times before receiving the final decision in September 1995. He told SAHRDC that UNHCR never informed him why he was rejected and that his appeal interview lasted only five minutes. Today, he has no stable place to live and no means of support. He depends on the kindness of his friends and colleagues for his survival.
UNHCR Responsiveness
UNHCR Legal Officers told SAHRDC that asylum-seekers are granted an interview within two weeks of making an application, with results to be expected in one month, if not sooner. The maximum amount of time an applicant may have to wait is two months.
UNHCR Legal Officers complain that delays in awarding status are the fault of asylum-seekers who have not responded to their appointment slips or who have missed them. Nonetheless, in a letter dated 3 March 1997, the CRC provided UNHCR with a list of fifteen refugees who had been initially rejected. No response had been made to their appeal letters and some had been waiting for one-and-a-half years.
SAHRDC has learned that many asylum-seekers miss their appointments through no fault of their own. Henry Val Thang of the CRC told SAHRDC the most common reason why refugees miss their appointments is because the letter does not reach them in time. Usually only about one week prior notice is given for UNHCR appointments.
Hunger Strikes
Over the past few years, several hunger strikes have been staged in front of UNHCR’s offices to protest the unfair treatment of Burmese asylum-seekers. The first such strike was launched on 14 November 1995 by seven families. In June 1995, UNHCR had asked them to come to Delhi. Four months later, their applications were rejected. Although Mr Rajiv Kapoor, then Deputy Chief of Mission, had promised to respond to their appeals by 24 November 1995, his response was delayed twice. The refugees ultimately met with second and final rejections. At that time, some applicants acquiesced and returned to the North East.
By May 1996, after being joined in their protest and after waiting for over one year, many in the group obtained official refugee status. However, in a sudden departure from previous practice, the UNHCR would only offer a one-time grant of Rs 4,300, to the round-trip travel expenses. Despite receiving warnings by Chin refugees and some NGOs of increased border insurgency and unrest, UNHCR urged the hunger strikers to return to Mizoram and said they would be safe.
For financial reasons, most hunger strikers had no choice but to give up their struggle. In July 1996, they returned to Mizoram hoping that their certificates would protect them, as UNHCR had promised. Unfortunately, back in Mizoram many were caught up in the July and August 1996 crackdowns. Ro Thla Peng (BU 224), a refugee who had participated in the hunger strikes, was arrested in Aizawl by CID on 10 August 1996. He was beaten by police and threatened with deportation unless he left Mizoram. Subsequently, he went into hiding and eventually made his way back to Delhi.
Protection
According to UNHCR’s Determination of Refugee Status, a recognized refugee has the right not to be sent back to the country of origin (refouled).
In December 1995, five SLORC soldiers defected to the CNF. Six more defected in July 1996. They were part of the LIG (Light Infantry Group) 268 and 269. After staying in the North East for several weeks, they travelled to Delhi to seek UNHCR protection. The first group of five defectors obtained UNHCR refugee status. The second group had been interviewed and their status decision pending when an Indian intelligence agent visited the New Delhi office of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB). There he told the staff that the defectors had to leave the city because of India’s policy on deserters and security threats. He suggested that they return to Mizoram where they could be protected in a camp. Ko Naing, President of the Democratic Students of Burma, offered to accompany the defectors back to the North East. After the army defectors and Ko Naing left with the Indian intelligence agent, their whereabouts became unknown.
At the end of August 1996, it was learnt that the Indian Government had handed the refugees over to the Burmese Army at the North East Command. Of the UNHCR-recognized refugees, some are believed to have been sentenced to death. Others have received sentences ranging from seven years to life in prison. Ko Naing was seen several months later in Monywa jail in Upper Burma. He is reportedly kept in a dark cell with his hands and legs tied up. He is paralyzed from the waist down from severe torture. In a state of severe mental instability, he is unwilling to speak with anyone.
The UNHCR claims that it learnt of the refoulement only after it happened. Informed sources revealed to SAHRDC, however, that UNHCR had received prior notification and told Burmese groups that if India (the host government) wanted to take action against any recognized refugee, their office “could not do much.”
Future Prospects
Training and Employment
Under a sub-contracting agreement with UNHCR, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) has been responsible for all refugee education and training courses since early 1996. (Before 1996, UNHCR had it’s own English language classes.) Without exception, every Burmese refugee surveyed by SAHRDC wanted to improve his/her English language ability. However, most neither knew about the YMCA English language courses nor where they took place. Of the six people interviewed by SAHRDC who had at one time registered for either UNHCR or YMCA classes, half dropped out because they felt the classes were not useful and of poor quality.
Although nearly 40% of Burmese refugees interviewed indicated an interest in taking Hindi classes, neither refugees nor their leaders were aware that the YMCA also offered them or that they were free.
The majority of refugees SAHRDC spoke with stated that they could not take either language course because of child care responsibilities or because they could not afford the bus fare. Some refugees also expressed doubt about the quality of the courses or their ability to follow the instruction.
According to the service providers, Burmese refugees do not participate in YMCA language training because they have their own classes. This is misinformed. Occasionally, an alternative for them has existed (for example, until January 1997, very popular English classes were sponsored by the Other Media, the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the British High Commission). However, the only Hindi language courses available to them are those offered by the YMCA.
YMCA Vocational Training
In 1996, YMCA was also sub-contracted by the UNHCR to provide vocational training to the refugees. The objective was to further refugee self-reliance and assimilation through work and income-generating activities.
Some of the vocational activities offered by the YMCA to refugees are: beauty culture, tailoring, motor mechanics, Television technology, refrigerator repair, air ticketing, baking and cooking, and computers. All courses are six months in duration.
Since the YMCA assumed responsibility for training, only a few refugees have completed vocational courses. As of June 1997, YMCA claimed that two refugees were enrolled in beauty culture, two in
television repair and one in a photography class that had not yet started. However, when SAHRDC visited the beauty culture class, only one Burmese, Aye Win, was in attendance.
Women
Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women cautions against targeting marginal economic activities for which there is no sustainable market. However, the YMCA offers gender-biased courses such as beauty culture, baking and cooking which have not led to economic self-sufficiency.
Child care and domestic duties also play a key role in preventing Burmese refugee women from participating in training programs. As per UNHCR global guidelines, provision of child care facilities are a good mechanism to boost refugee women’s participation in rehabilitation programs. Although there is day-care at the YMCA Vikaspuri education center, Burmese refugees are not aware of it.
Special Assistance
In 1996, along with training and education, UNHCR sub-contracted the YMCA to handle the needs assessment arm of its rehabilitation program, which includes home visits and the determination of Special Assistance (UNHCR financial assistance). According to UNHCR Project Officers, there are three circumstances under which Burmese refugees will not receive SA: when they are found not to be in residence; when they are lump sum recipients; and when they have been in India for six or seven years before applying for protection.
Although many YMCA and UNHCR officials complain that Burmese refugees are not at home when they carry out their visits, most of the refugees SAHRDC interviewed had legitimate excuses. One
quarter of the forty refugees SAHRDC interviewed in Janakpuri do not have a permanent address and frequently shift residences to decrease the burden of their support on any one household. Many also purposely stay out of the home during the day (when the YMCA conducts its home visits), so as to lessen their imposition on the family they are staying with.
SAHRDC has learned of some refugees who reside in the North East but who come to Delhi only to pick up their SA. However, this occurs only in small numbers and for a combination of economic and political reasons. Burmese refugees point out that their UNHCR certificates specify their “stay in India,” not their stay in Delhi. They claim that the SA policy is unclear and inconsistent. For example, some know of refugees who are receiving SA in Bangalore, while one individual had his SA cut because he lives in a town six hours from Delhi.
Subsistence Allowance
As per UNHCR current practice, a primary applicant refugee (head of household) receives Rs 1200 per month as Subsistence Allowance (SA) and collects Rs 500 per month for each of the first three dependents. The fourth, fifth, and sixth dependents are allotted Rs 400 each and the seventh and eighth dependents Rs 200 each. Those who receive SA must struggle to make this amount stretch to cover rent, utilities, and food. In one large family, a refugee confided to our researcher that to make ends meet, a young female relative has resorted to prostitution.
As of the end of April 1997, of the total UNHCR-registered Burmese caseload, 249 persons (103 cases) were not receiving any SA. Of these cases, a “few” were well-employed or self-reliant and 89 persons (70 cases) were lump sum grant recipients. There were 160 persons (33 cases) who were neither receiving SA nor who had taken the lump sum. UNHCR’s figures indicate that 55% of the Burmese refugee community do not receive SA.
Refugees told SAHRDC that they are repeatedly threatened with the termination of their SA. Several months ago, for example, Benjamin Tang Neng (BU 232) had his SA cut arbitrarily. When he called the UNHCR, he was told that he was “not eligible” and no other reason was offered. On a visit to the UNHCR office, he was told that his SA was cut because he is a Chin (incidentally, he is not). After visiting UNHCR offices about ten times, his financial assistance was resumed.
On a visit to UNHCR-sponsored medical facilitiess, a SAHRDC researcher saw a notice that was dated 17 April 1997. It stated that that starting 1 May 1997, there would be a new schedule for picking up SA whereby the Burmese would have only one day to collect. Furthermore, “pay of SA and other assistance not collected within the [given] date will be canceled.” Most Burmese refugees never go to the medical facility where the policy notice was posted. Moreover, only two weeks time was given between the date of posting and the date the policy came into effect. Some refugees were not aware of this new policy and lost their family’s full two month SA. This was financially catastrophic for them.
Subsistence Allowance and Employment
UNHCR/ YMCA maintains that SA is not stopped when refugees earn extra income. They told SAHRDC that refugees are permitted to earn small amounts, such as Rs 700 per month, without having their SA cut. Even if more money was earned, for example, Rs 1500 per month, SA would continue for some months. However, it was not made clear to SAHRDC when and under what circumstances SA would be cut. SAHRDC was told that the decision would be made on a case-by-case basis. Interestingly, when SAHRDC told them what the service providers had claimed, they responded with disbelief and amusement.
Many refugees cited examples of people they know whose SA was cut, even though the money they earned was within the permitted amounts.
Lump Sum
About one third of the entire Burmese caseload are lump sum grant recipients. Introduced in 1993, the lump sum program aims to provide refugees with capital to establish a small business and attain financial self-sufficiency. The lump sum amount, given in one capital transfer, is equivalent to one year’s worth of SA.
As of the end of April 1997, 89 persons (70 cases) had taken the lump sum and went to the North East where it was cheaper to live and launch a business. Most of the refugees used up the money quickly, to repay debts or to help family members and others in the community. Without having any prior business experience, support services, or monitoring, the businesses failed.
UNHCR’s ill-conceived program had unfair and far-reaching consequences for the refugees: once the lump sum grant was taken, a refugee is never again eligible to receive SA or any other financial assistance from UNHCR.
YMCA claims that the lump sum program has been improved in recent years. The one-time grant is now not necessarily given to all who ask for it. YMCA interviews the applicant and the grant is only awarded to those whom they feel will “actually start a business.”
Discrimination against Women
Female primary applicants are generally allocated the same SA as a man, however, if she later marries, she is downgraded to a dependent and receives only Rs 500 per month. If a refugee man marries either a refugee woman or a non-refugee woman, he still receives his SA plus an additional Rs 500 per month for his wife. This policy contradicts UN principles and discriminates against both women and married couples. It unequally bestows benefits on men, thereby reinforcing sexist notions, and creating a situation of dependency for wives. Moreover, it supports the traditional stereotype that women are domestic and dependent while men are the breadwinners active in the public sphere.
Other Social Services
Health
Under a sub-contracting agreement made with UNHCR in January 1996, the Voluntary Health Association of Delhi (VHAD) assumed responsibility to administer health services to all Delhi-based refugees. Due to confusion, misunderstanding and, in some cases, dislike for anything connected with the UNHCR, most refugees interviewed by SAHRDC had never visited the clinic and instead preferred to visit either the health clinic managed by the Women’s Relief and Welfare Association of Burma (WRWAB) in Janakapuri (popularly called the “Burmese clinic) or seek assistance from other health professionals.
Some positive steps have been taken towards more effective outreach and participation in regards to health. For example,
when Leena Saxena, the Medical Social Worker at the VHAD Vikaspuri noticed that few Burmese were coming to the clinic she accompanied social workers on home visits in Janakpuri. While there, she visited the “Burmese clinic” and consulted with the doctors. Another recent initiative taken by VHAD is the hiring of a few Burmese refugees as Health Assistants to facilitate communication between the Vikaspuri center and the refugee community. As of July 1997, the arrangements for the Health Assistants were not yet finalized.
There are promising steps, however, most refugees in Janakpuri still do not even know where the Vikaspuri clinic is located. Complaints of quality and availability of medical resources also persist.
For example, about four people who had visited the VHAD Vikaspuri clinic mentioned to SAHRDC that it did not have adequate medicines.
When SAHRDC mentioned this to the clinic, the researcher was told that they only rarely run out of medicines and that when they do, they promptly restock. However, while visiting the Malviya Nagar VHAD health center, the SAHRDC researcher saw a notice posted stating that if the VHAD clinics do not have the medication a refugee is seeking, UNHCR/VHAD will not reimburse them for purchasing the medicine from another source.
Education
Although the UNHCR’s global mandate is to provide educational assistance only up to the 10th standard, under its “Special Assistance program,” educational aid is offered to “credible” 11th and 12th standard students. However, the criteria needed to be deemed “credible” is neither understood nor spelled out. Fortunately, OSI and other international groups do contribute funds for refugees to pursue higher education, however, available funds do not meet the large demand. As part of its sub-contracting agreement with the UNHCR, YMCA implements the educational assistance program.
As with the YMCA’s vocational training program, many refugee parents are not aware of the educational benefits available for their children. When asked, both YMCA and UNHCR told SAHRDC that they were currently in the process of writing policies and guidelines and an information sheet on educational assistance.
Many children receiving assistance from the YMCA attend the Savior Convent school, which has the largest number of Burmese refugee children in Delhi (roughly 34 pupils). Through funds provided by OSI and JWP, the WRWAB manages its own primary school, educating 22 Burmese refugee students in the 1st through 4th standard. After completing primary school, the children enter the Indian school system.
Despite the assistance they receive, refugees still struggle to educate their children. The parents also stated that they are forced to meet significant costs out of their own pockets, for transportation and uniforms.
In addition to the costs, refugees face other barriers to education. Sometimes students are barred from admission because they missed several years of schooling when they fled SLORC’s oppression. Teachers complain that language and cultural barriers demand more attention than they are able to give.
Furthermore, according to UNHCR policy, if a child is more than four years behind in school, they are termed “over-age.” “Over-age” children are ineligible for the general education reimbursement program. Consequently, some refugee children are unable to access their full rights to development and equality as stated under the Convention of the Rights on the Child (CRC), of which India is a signatory.
When asked what other educational options existed, the UNHCR Project Officer for Education told SAHRDC about the “Open School System” which is recommended for “over-age” students aged 15-20 years. Although UNHCR covers 90% of the costs, SAHRDC did not encounter any refugees who were aware of the program.
Higher Education
Under its global policy, UNHCR will provide financial assistance to those refugees who can prove they were eligible to be refugees when they were forced to flee. Sixty-five per cent of those who fled Burma and came to India were high school students at the time of the 1988 military coup. Others were at various stages in their
undergraduate and graduate-level studies. Unfortunately, most cannot prove their qualifications because they did not bring their educational certificates with them. Even with generous grants from international sources, it is difficult for most refugees to meet their living costs while they pursue higher education.
Until 1995, Indian Universities were closed to Burmese refugees. Although they are now permitted to take Indian placement tests, Burmese refugees must pay foreigner’s fees. The other option, for Christian refugees such as the Chins, are Bible and Seminary Institutes which have relatively low tuition fees and offer work-study programs.
Conclusions: Service Delivery
Principles of respect and sensitivity in dealing with refugees are specified in UNHCR guidelines, however, based on its research SAHRDC is concerned that such principles are not being adequately observed by UNHCR in India. Moreover, a lack of communication, outreach, and accessibility exists in the services provided by both UNHCR and its sub-contractors.
SAHRDC’s research has revealed that the vast majority of Burmese refugees equate UNHCR as being unresponsive, arbitrary, or inefficient. More than a quarter of the forty survey respondents mentioned that they had been made to feel low or inferior. “They treat us like criminals, like homeless people. We feel insulted by them,” spoke one refugee leader. Conversely, about a quarter of the respondents indicated that they had at least one experience with a UNHCR staff person that they would characterize as “nice” or “OK.”
The minority of refugees who are aware of, and who access services are largely unsatisfied with them. UNHCR does not have an effective procedure for attaining self-reliance through its financial assistance and training interventions. Programs and policies lack clarity, follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation. Sometimes refugees report reluctance to obtain medical, training, or legal services because of other negative experiences or overall frustration with UNHCR.
As observed by SAHRDC, international standards are frequently overlooked in the provision of education and health services. Moreover, in their provision of SA, UNHCR India’s policy discriminates against women. Finally, in many areas, there is a disturbing gap between what the UNHCR claims that they carry out and provide for the refugees and what actually occurs.